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Abstract
Chapter 1 exploits the emergence of two de facto states in Côte d’Ivoire during
the 2002-2010 political crisis to examine the effects of export tax reduction on the
living standards of cocoa farming households. Combining both spatial and temporal
variations in exposure to a set of dichotomous export tax policies, I find that farmers
in low export tax districts significantly increased their consumption expenditures
relative to farmers in high export tax districts. I also provide evidence that the
transmission of border prices to local farmers is a relevant mechanism through which
the reduction of trade barriers enhances cocoa farmers’ living standards.
Chapter 2 documents that contemporary political development in Africa is highly
associated with the pre-colonial ethnic institutional background of the first national
leaders. Using either direct measures of democracy and/or covariates of political
participation from anthropological records, I show that the political legacy of the
first African heads of states who inherited egalitarian and democratic norms from
their ancestors has been autocracy. This statistical relationship is not only robust
to an array of control variables including economic, geographic and historical fac-
tors, but potential endogeneity concerns that may undermine its validity are also
addressed. Finally, exploring the potential mechanisms at play, I provide evidence
that the natural resource potential of certain countries may have diverted their first
national leaders away from their ancestral institutional heritage.
Chapter 3 shows a strong and positive relationship between the ethnic affiliation
of African leaders and satellite nighttime luminosity in the historical homelands of
ethnic groups. Using a unique dataset on 630 ethnicities and 86 leaders from 48








In many developing countries, export taxes are often used by governments as a shield
against revenue losses due to declining prices and deteriorating terms of trade in
agricultural commodities. However, when export taxes are too high, they can de-
press farmers’ earnings, deter production, and decrease public receipts (McMillan
2001). Because export taxes remain quite popular in many developing countries,
they have received a lot of attention in the development literature. For exam-
ple, it has been suggested that many factors, including pro-urban or interest-group
bias (Bates 1981, Widner 1993), dynamic inconsistency (McMillan 2001), and in-
complete information (Rodrik 1998) have contributed to the persistence of exorbi-
tant export tax rates in developing countries. As a consequence, many economies in
Africa experienced a significant decline in their market shares for primary commodi-
ties during the 1980s (McMillan 2001). Yet, there is little if any empirical evidence
establishing a causal link between export taxes and farmers’ living standards. In
this analysis, I fill this gap by providing evidence that reducing export taxes sig-
nificantly improves farmers’ living standards. I also document that one potential
mechanism that explains this causal relationship is the price premium associated
1
with export tax incentives.
This article exploits the advent of two de facto states in Côte d’Ivoire, the world’s
largest cocoa supplier, as a ‘natural experiment’ to examine the causal effect of ex-
port tax incentives on cocoa farmers’ living standards, as measured by consumption
expenditure. In autumn of 2002, an armed conflict split the country into a rebel-held
area in the north (hereafter Northern CI) and a government-controlled territory in
the south (hereafter Southern CI). This partition had significant implications for the
cocoa sector, which alone employs about one-fifth of the twenty millions inhabitants
of the country. The acting authorities of Northern CI, where cocoa production rep-
resents between 10% and 25% of the average national production (about 1.2 millions
metric tons per year), drastically reduced export tax rates levied on cocoa beans.1
Between 2002 and 2007, as exporters in the south faced the pre-partition tax rate
of 220 FCFA ($0.44) per kilogram, their counterparts in the north paid between 50
FCFA ($0.10) and 150 FCFA ($0.30) per kilogram. This is equivalent to an average
difference of about 75% between the two tax regimes.2
Using two waves of the Côte d’Ivoire household living standards surveys (HLSS),
the pre and post partition “Enquête sur le Niveau de Vie des Ménages” (ENV 2002,
ENV 2008), I analyze the effects of export tax relief on cocoa farmers’ average con-
sumption expenditure.3 For this, I rely principally on the difference-in-difference-
in-differences (hereafter DDD) identification strategy. By exploiting changes in con-
sumption between cocoa and non-cocoa farmers in the experimental state (Northern
CI), the DDD approach accounts for location-specific shocks affecting all farmers
1According to Witness (2007), the acting Minister of Economy in the north estimated the
cocoa beans production in this area at 130,000 metric tons per year, i.e. 10 percent of the national
production, approximately the annual production of Ecuador, the world’s seventh largest cocoa
producer. Another estimation, provided by the Director of the fiscal agency of the northern
authorities, set cocoa production to 325,000 metric tons per year i.e. 20-25 percent of the national
production.
2Before the creation in 2004 of the custom and tax organization (‘La Centrale’) in Northern
CI, export taxes were set at $0.10 per kilogram of cocoa beans.
3ENV stands for Enquête sur le Niveau de Vie des Ménages which means Household Living
Standard Survey (HLSS).
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equally in this territory. It is also less vulnerable to time trends affecting all indi-
viduals across states because it takes into account changes in consumption among
cocoa and non-cocoa farmers in the control state (Southern CI). To strengthen this
identification strategy, I include a full set of fixed effects including province fixed
effects, survey-round-districts fixed effects and survey-round-province fixed effects.
To make the treatment and control groups as comparable as possible, I also consider
the sample of individual farmers who resided in provinces belonging to the districts
split between the two states.4
Estimates based on the DDD technique show that living standards of cocoa farm-
ers residing in northern provinces, where exporters faced lower tax rates, improved
significantly following the implementation of the tax relief policy. For example,
the unconditional specification reported in table 1.3 suggests that exposure to low
export taxes was associated with a relative increase in cocoa producers’ average
consumption expenditure by about 43% between 2002 and 2008. This is equivalent
to an increase in consumption from the sample mean of 88,740 FCFA ($177.5) to ap-
proximately 126,900 FCFA ($254) over the 2002-2008 period. To ensure that these
results are not driven by other tax-independent systematic shocks on consumption,
I conduct a series of falsification exercises and robustness checks which support my
identification hypotheses. Finally, I show that pass-through of international prices
to local producers is a relevant underlying mechanism of this causal link between
export taxes and farmers’ consumption. In particular, estimates based on the un-
conditional price equation suggest that farmers residing in low tax areas tended to
get an additional 39 FCFA ($0.08) on each kilogram of cocoa beans sold.
The present paper contributes to the debate about the short-run implications of
liberalization policies on household well-being. The controversy is particularly fueled
4Before the administrative reform of 2011, Côte d’Ivoire was divided into 58 provinces (dé-
partements) regrouped into 19 administrative districts (régions). By focusing on the districts split
between Northern and Southern CI, I assume that shared socio-economic, cultural and geographic
characteristics within districts facilitate comparisons across groups.
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by the distributive nature of trade reforms, which often disproportionately reallo-
cate earnings across households. For example, labor-saving productivity advances
can temporarily aggravate poverty through their detrimental effects on employment
(Winters, McCulloch & McKay 2004). Researchers who have investigated the is-
sue, using different empirical techniques, have come up with mixed results. Among
other findings, it has been suggested, for example, that while penalizing the poor in
India, trade liberalization also appears to be a source of income disparity in South
Asia (Anderson, Cockburn & Martin 2010).5 Yet, these seemingly unenthusias-
tic outcomes should be contrasted with the majority of the empirical assessments
suggesting that trade liberalization has a strong pro-poor impact [see Winters, Mc-
Culloch & McKay (2004) and Anderson, Cockburn & Martin (2010) for a literature
review]. Because it builds upon a ‘natural experiment’ this article extends previous
research that investigates a causal link between trade liberalization in agriculture
and household living standards in developing countries [see Topalova (2007) and Ed-
monds & Pavcnik (2006)]. However, the source of time and cross-sectional variations
in exposure to the degree of liberalization makes this analysis plausibly less sensitive
to endogenous political and economic processes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 1.2, I review some
relevant historical and institutional background on the emergence of two de facto
states during the 2002-2007 Ivorian political crisis. Section 1.3 elaborates on the
data and the identification strategy. Section 1.4 provides details on the empirics of
export taxation and consumption and highlights the main results. Finally, I examine
theoretically and empirically the price pass-through mechanism in section 1.5 and
conclude in section 1.6.
5As reported in Anderson, Cockburn & Martin (2010), farmers in India benefit from substan-
tial subsidies and other protection policies whose complete removal can severely deteriorate their
earnings. These authors also observe that although trade reforms can help shrink the gap between
farm and nonfarm earnings, its effect on inequality in agriculture would be less prevalent in South
Asia in particular because of the rise of income dispersion among farmers.
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1.2 Institutional Background
1.2.1 Insurgency and the Creation of Two De Facto States
For almost two decades after its independence, Côte d’Ivoire was one of the richest
economies in Western Africa and acquired a reputation for political and economic
success within the region. Between 1960 and 1980, the country maintained strong
and sustained economic growth of more than 7 percent per annum. Over the same
period, average GDP per capita was about $1330 (in 2005 US dollars), nearly 6.3
percent of that of the United States. Dependent on primary commodities such as
cocoa and coffee (more than 50% of total export in 2000), the Ivorian economy
experienced an abrupt and lengthy decline in the 1980s, due in large part to the
deterioration of the terms of trade (Espina, Bogetic & Noer 2007). By the time the
country devalued its currency in 1993, its ten year average GDP growth had fallen
to 0.50 percent.
In December 1999, a coup d’état perpetrated by a former chief-of-staff of the
national army plunged the country into a vicious cycle of instability, so common
in Sub-Saharan African states. Since then, the political scene of Côte d’Ivoire has
been characterized by several episodes of turbulence ranging from street protests
to anti-government subversions. The level and the scope of violence reached its
peak in September 2002, when an initially unknown armed group simultaneously
attacked the main cities of the country including Abidjan the capital city. Although
the rebels, who would later be known as the Patriotic Movement of Côte d’Ivoire
(MPCI), failed to overthrow the government, they were able to tighten their grip
over the north half of the national territory. The MPCI initially took control of
Bouaké in the center and Daloa in the west, the second and third largest cities
of the country, respectively. Other important northern localities such as Korhogo,
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Odienné, and Bouna also fell under rebel control. A counter-offensive by government
troops against the rebels allowed them to regain the province of Daloa, but they
failed to reconquer the other above-mentioned towns.
In November 2002, two other armed groups, the Movement for Justice and Peace
(MJP) and the Ivorian Popular Movement for the Great West (MPIGO), seized
control of the western cocoa-producing towns of Man and Danané, respectively. In
early December 2002, the loyalist forces dislodged the rebels from the town of Man,
but, unable to sustain their position, they finally abandoned the town in the hands
of the rebels at the end of the same month. The three movements coalesced in
late December 2002 into the Forces Nouvelles of Côte d’Ivoire (FNCI) and claimed
control over 60% of the country. The Linas-Marcoursis peace agreement, signed
in January 2003 by the belligerents and the government, established a buffer zone
secured by French and UN peacekeepers, which formalized the cohabitation of two
de facto states (Balint-Kurti 2007).
Unlike the rebellions in Liberia and Sierra-Leone, where territorial controls were
often associated with ‘scorched-earth’, ‘denial-of-resource’ tactics (Innes 2005), or
‘no living thing’ operations (Gberie 2005), the rebels of the Forces Nouvelles opted
for an autonomous governance system.6 They organized their territory into ten
jurisdictions, called ‘zones’, with each zone being administered by representatives
of both the military and executive wings of the rebellion.
From a political economy perspective, existing theories on conflicts, which often
emphasize ‘greed’ over ‘grievance’ as the main source of armed conflicts in developing
countries, may not be sufficient to understand the Ivorian crisis. Africanists such
as Marshall-Fratani (2006) and Bah (2010) argue that the Ivorian crisis should be
understood as the consequence of state actors’ preferences for non-inclusive policies
6‘No living thing’ was a joint-operation by the Sierra Leone army and the Revolutionary
United Front (RUF) in 1998-1999, which consisted in killing people and destroying properties
indiscriminately.
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in a melting pot society. For these authors, the introduction of the concept of Ivoirité
in the political discourse and the legal system in the mid-1990s generated social and
political discriminations against certain categories of citizens.7 These communities,
in particular the northern ethnic groups and the descendants of the immigrants,
felt despoiled from their constitutional rights on citizenship, land ownership, and
political participation. This ethno-political grievance is thought to have set the
stage for the 2002-2007 quasi-secession in Côte d’Ivoire (Bah 2010).
1.2.2 Implications for the Cocoa Trade
In Côte d’Ivoire, the cocoa sector has long been portrayed as the backbone of the
national economy. The production of cocoa beans in the country is heavily concen-
trated in three regional groupings: the south-east (Moyen-Comoé), the center-west
(Marahoué, Haut-Sassandra, Fromager and Sud-Bandaman), and the south-west
(Dix-Huit Montagnes, Moyen-Cavally and Bas-Sassandra). Together, these districts
contribute up to 87 percent of the national cocoa production (Primature 2006). Of
the 8 administrative districts subdivided between the two ‘states’, half were among
the major sources of cocoa production. These split districts are of a particular in-
terest for this ‘natural experiment’ since communities belonging to them plausibly
share similar cultural, socio-economic and geographic features. These include the
districts of Marahoué, Haut-Sassandra, Dix-Huit Montagnes, Moyen-Cavally, Vallée
du Bandama, Lacs, N’Zi Comoé and Zanzan (see Figure ??).
In the midst of the political crisis, net export of cocoa beans from Côte d’Ivoire
in 2004-08 exceeded 1.26 million metric tons per year, which represented more than
40 percent of the world share (ICCO, 2010). Although, this is a clear indication that
the partition of the country had little effect on its production capability, the distri-
7The concept of Ivoirité was initially introduced by the former president Henri Konan Bédié
(1993-1999), to promote the cultural identity of the country. It turns out that the concept was























Figure 1.1: Côte d’Ivoire as Two de facto States (2002-2007)
Notes: The demarcation line separating Northern and Southern CI is a buffer zone placed under
the surveillance of international forces. Regional and provincial boundaries are described by thick
and thin black lines, respectively. The colored (or dark in black-and-white paper) regions with
different levels of degradation represent the districts split between the two states.
8
butional effects of the crisis on revenues cannot be ignored. An obvious consequence
of the conflict stems from the emergence of a new state actor, the Forces Nouvelles
of Côte d’Ivoire (FNCI), with a fiscal capacity over a territory which makes up be-
tween 10 percent and 25 percent of the national cocoa production. In the provinces
they controlled, the FNCI managed to maintain an operational bureaucracy which
filled up the administrative void created by the absence of the official government.
For example, they preserved some of the public infrastructures which facilitated the
provision of a minimum service in education and health by local and international
non-governmental organizations (Bah 2010, Balint-Kurti 2007).
Moreover, it has been documented that the FNCI introduced an export tax
scheme on cocoa beans that was by far more competitive than the one in place
in the government-controlled territory (Guesnet, Müller & Schure 2010). Such a
policy may have induced significant implications for the revenues of non-institutional
players such as cocoa farmers, itinerant traders, and exporters. Did the FNCI
adopt a favorable export tax policy in the first place to help potential beneficiaries?
As already mentioned, political scientists have put forward a number of reasons
to explain the attempted coup that led to the partition of the country in 2002.
These include ethno-political grievances such as rights for citizenships and political
participation. It is also unlikely that the preferential export tax policy was intended
to help the farmers. Instead, the northern authorities made it clear that their goal
was to attract more exporters, mobilize more revenues, cut additional funds to
Southern CI, and ultimately finance their war effort (Guesnet, Müller & Schure
2010).
Before the partition in 2002, the export tax levied by the government, known as
the droit unique de sortie (DUS), was 220 FCFA ($0.44) per kilogram of cocoa beans
across the country. While this tariff rate remained unchanged in the government-
controlled south, the FNCI drastically reduced it to 50 FCFA ($0.1) per kilogram
9
as soon as they consolidated their grip over the north in late 2002 (Witness 2007).
Later in 2004, they set up a more resourceful tax and custom organization, known as
La Centrale, under which export tax on cocoa fluctuated between 125 FCFA ($0.25)
and 150 FCFA ($0.30) per kilogram (Balint-Kurti 2007). Because La Centrale had
sufficient resources to collect taxes at both the warehouses and borders, it is fair to
assume that smuggling was limited.8 The advantage of the low tariff policy is well
summarized by an exporter in the south interviewed by Guesnet, Müller & Schure
(2010):
Last week I saw a lot of cross-border transport. ... We [exporter in
the south] pay Francs CFA 333 taxes per kilo.9 This means that those
people who go to Bobo-Dioulasso [Burkina Faso] already benefit from
avoiding paying this sum. The interest to do this is big. Even for the
European firms, they say ‘if I can get this lower price.10 (p. 46)
Many players are involved in Côte d’Ivoire’s cocoa trade, but the most important
ones are the farmers, the itinerant buyers and the exporters. Farmers sell their crops
to itinerant buyers (traitants) either directly or via occasional traders called pisteurs
at farm-gate price. The traitants sell in turn their products to exporters, who in turn
supply the international market (Kireyev 2010). This paper is particularly concerned
about the causal effect of such a liberalization policy on smallholder cocoa farmers
in Côte d’Ivoire. Looking at this first layer of the cocoa supply chain is attractive
8According to Witness (2007), “La Centrale has about 150 staff, including civilians and military,
deployed at the zones’ borders, in offices in major towns and at checkpoints. In each of 10 FN
sub-zones, it also has one representative, a ‘régisseur’ who works with the tax officials.”
9This estimate of 333 FCFA ($0.67) includes, in addition to the main export tax (DUS) of
220 FCFA ($0.44), other fiscal and quasi-fiscal levies such as the registration tax as well as fees
collected by the regulatory institutions.
10According to Witness (2007), most of the cocoa beans from Northern CI was first transported
to Bobo-Dioulasso, in Burkina Faso, before being exported outside Africa via the port of Lomé in
Togo. Exporters used this route because it allows them to avoid double taxation. In fact, taking
advantage of the free trade agreement between the members of the West African Economic and
Monetary Union, exporters who paid the export taxes in Côte d’Ivoire could not be subject to the
same taxes in Burkina Faso and Togo, also members of the Union.
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for several reasons. First, it offers an opportunity to assess the effectiveness of price
transmission from exporters to farmers, despite the complexity of the supply chain.
Second, farm households’ expenditures appear also to be a good proxy for earnings
in rural areas since, as pointed by Winters, McCulloch & McKay (2004), farmers
tend to spend their additional revenues on goods and services provided by other
poor households. Finally, it enables me to explore how the reduction of export
restrictions affects specific expenditure categories such as investments in education
and health or the satisfaction of basic needs such as food and clothing.
1.3 Data and Methodology
1.3.1 Côte d’Ivoire Living Standards Survey Data
I use the 2002 and 2008 Côte d’Ivoire HLSS, known as the Enquête sur le Niveau
de Vie des Ménages (ENV), compiled by the Institut National de la Statistique
(INS). Interestingly, the 2002 and the 2008 rounds of the ENV were conducted
three months before the inception of the conflict and a year after the dismantlement
of the demarcation line, respectively. The ENV (2002) and ENV (2008) provide a
rich set of information on living standards, demographics, and location for 10,800
and 12,600 households, respectively. There are 4,891 individual cocoa farmers in
the combined surveys. Summary statistics for this sample indicate that the average
per capita total consumption expenditure, in constant national currency, was about
88,740 FCFA or approximately 178 in US dollars (see Column 3 Panel A of Table
1.1). More than 70% of this expenditure was devoted to the basic needs such as
food and clothing for resident and non-resident (transfers for example) household
members, 17% of it went to investment in education and health, and the remainder
was allocated to other types of spending including leisure and transportation.
Table 1.1 also provides information on the temporal and spatial distribution of
11
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics For Cocoa Farmers
Full Sample Southern CI Northern CI
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
2002 2008 Pooled 2002 2008 Pooled 2002 2008 Pooled
Panel A: Outcomes
Education 4.72 14.68 8.78 4.86 14.98 9.19 4.04 12.21 6.47
(13.6) (23.4) (18.89) (14.5) (23.67) (19.62) (8.29) (20.98) (13.87)
Health 6.96 6.12 6.62 7.7 6.05 6.99 3.58 6.65 4.49
(33.26) (16.24) (27.61) (36.43) (13.18) (28.88) (8.53) (31.71) (18.72)
Transfer 21.99 34.21 26.98 24.35 34.1 28.52 11.1 35.07 18.22
(54.97) (79.77) (66.49) (58.9) (80.56) (69.16) (28.57) (73.22) (47.74)
Clothing 24.43 29.07 26.32 26.31 28.47 27.24 15.75 33.90 21.14
(32.92) (32.28) (32.73) (35.15) (31.11) (33.49) (17.11) (40.34) (27.49)
Food 10.50 9.22 9.98 11.23 9.24 10.38 7.11 9.10 7.70
(11.15) (9.33) (10.46) (11.67) (9.37) (10.79) (7.46) (9.01) (7.99)
Other 10.03 10.09 10.06 10.90 9.99 10.51 6.051 10.93 7.50
(28.43) (18.35) (24.81) (30.92) (18.60) (26.36) (10.33) (16.21) (12.55)
Total 78.63 103.4 88.74 85.35 102.8 92.83 47.64 107.9 65.53
(113.8) (132.2) (122.3) (122.0) (130.3) (125.9) (53.53) (147.2) (95.83)
Price 538 453 488 549 456 493 485 430 458
(134) (85) (116) (131) (82) (114) (138) (104) (125)
Panel B: Head Characteristics
Age 46.69 45.70 46.14 46.37 45.70 45.99 48.17 45.68 46.99
(15.26) (14.24) (14.70) (15.29) (14.2) (14.67) (15.04) (14.59) (14.87)
Male 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.95
Married 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.87 0.88 0.88
Literate 0.42 0.51 0.47 0.44 0.53 0.49 0.35 0.38 0.36
Panel C: Household Characteristics
Size 6.33 5.97 6.13 6.26 6.03 6.13 6.65 5.53 6.12
(4.03) (3.77) (3.89) (4.04) (3.88) (3.95) (3.99) (2.91) (3.56)
Cement/Tile
Floor
0.57 0.51 0.53 0.57 0.51 0.54 0.58 0.46 0.53
Mobile 0.03 0.21 0.12 0.03 0.22 0.14 0.01 0.10 0.05
Rural 0.93 0.87 0.90 0.92 0.87 0.89 0.97 0.88 0.93
Ethnicity
Akan 0.33 0.35 0.34 0.38 0.40 0.39 0.07 0.06 0.07
Krou 0.27 0.19 0.22 0.25 0.19 0.22 0.33 0.19 0.27
Mande North 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.06
Mande South 0.15 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.44 0.37 0.41
Voltaique 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.04
Others 0.18 0.25 0.22 0.19 0.25 0.22 0.10 0.22 0.16
Religion
Christian 0.41 0.44 0.43 0.44 0.46 0.45 0.26 0.31 0.28
Muslim 0.21 0.27 0.24 0.22 0.26 0.25 0.14 0.31 0.22
Others 0.38 0.29 0.33 0.33 0.28 0.30 0.60 0.38 0.50
Observations 2142 2749 4891 1758 2400 4158 384 349 733
Notes: In panel A, data on consumption expenditure and price per kilogram of cocoa beans are
reported. Consumption expenditures are denominated in thousands of constant Franc CFA. Price
is deflated by the domestic consumer price index. Approximatively, 500 FCFA correspond to $1.
Categories of consumption are: investment in education and health; food and clothing expenditure;
money transfers to non-resident household members; and other types of spending such as leisure,
maintenance, transportation, etc. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Household
characteristics as well as the characteristics of the household head are presented in panels B and
C. [Data Source] ENV (2002) and ENV (2008)
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cocoa farmers’ per capita expenditure (Columns 4-9, Panel A). In terms of total
expenditure, cocoa farmers in Southern CI with 92,830 FCFA ($186) did relatively
better than their peers in Northern CI, who spent on average 65,530 FCFA ($131).
Nonetheless, looking at changes in expenditure across surveys shows that cocoa
farmers in Northern CI significantly increased their per capita expenditure. In par-
ticular, while cocoa farmers in Southern CI increased their consumption expenditure
by approximately 20% between 2002 and 2008, consumption among their Northern
counterparts went up by about 126% over the 5 year period. Some important char-
acteristics of the household such as the age, gender, marital status of its head, its
size and whether it belongs to a rural community are on average less likely to reflect
these large differences in the living standards implied by the evolution of per capita
expenditure. In fact, both the cocoa farmers in Southern and Northern CI were
similar along these dimensions. For example, these farmers were essentially male
(94%), married (85-88%), rural dwellers (87-93%), and on average 46 years old. As
for the ethnic and religious affiliations as well as the degree of literacy, there was
a great deal of heterogeneity among cocoa farmers in Southern and Northern CI.
Cocoa farmers in Southern CI were more literate than those in Northern CI (49% vs.
36%); they were largely members of the Akan ethnic group (39% vs. 7%) and had
fewer Mande Southern ethnicities than cocoa farmers in Northern CI (7% vs. 41%).
Despite these differences or similarities at the mean, a robust investigation requires
that this inquiry takes these characteristics into account, as control variables, in a
more elaborate empirical exercise.
As already discussed, a major implication of the 2002-2007 armed conflict was
the reallocation of communities - including the lands farmers used to grow their crops
- to two separate territories in the same country. Moreover, the acting authorities
in Northern CI (the FNCI) provided an export tax incentive in their territory that
was more profitable for cocoa exporters than the tariff scheme in place in South-
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ern CI. Raw data about farm-gate prices paid to cocoa producers by intermediary
traders seem to indicate some important patterns of incentive transmission in favor
of Northern farmers. As shown in Panel A of Table 1.1, farm-gate prices (deflated
by the domestic consumer price index) decreased by about 93 FCFA in Southern CI
between 2002 and 2008, which was approximately 70% higher than the fall in prices
in Northern CI.
As pointed out by Benjamin & Deaton (1993), mean observations are less ap-
pealing than nonparametric distribution approaches when it comes to analyzing
households’ consumption in the field of agriculture. Following these authors, I com-
pare in figure 1.2 the cross-state distribution of the log per capita consumption
expenditure for cocoa farmers (top panel) and non-cocoa farmers (lower panel).
Two important results stem from these distributions. First, as the pre and post-
partition gaps in average consumption across states remained stable for non-cocoa
farmers (lower panel), cocoa farmers in Northern CI significantly converged towards
the consumption levels of their southern counterparts between the two periods. Fig-
ure ?? provides a much more intuitive, albeit simpler, visual representation of this
convergence in consumption. The improvement in living standards, as measured by
log per capita consumption expenditure, for the northerners relative to the south-
erners was approximately 0.411. Second, the kernel density displayed in figure 1.2
reveals that the preferential export tax policy also had important distributional ef-
fects. The effect is particularly more pronounced in the lower tail of the distribution,
suggesting that the poorest farmers in Northern CI benefited relatively more from
the tax reduction. In the following sections, I rely on a set of robust parametric and
non-parametric econometric techniques to examine the causal effect on consumption
of the liberalization policy implemented in Northern CI between 2002 and 2007.
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of Expenditures Across States and Sectors
Notes: Each panel compares the kernel distribution of the logarithm per capita consumption ex-
penditure by sector across states. The mean difference is computed as the average log consumption
expenditure in Southern CI (red or dashed line) minus the average log consumption expenditure
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Figure 1.3: Differences in Average Expenditure
Notes: Each panel compares the differences in average log consumption expenditure between other
farmers (left panel) and cocoa farmers (right panel) across states.
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1.3.2 Identification
In this study, I exploit two plausible sources of exogenous variations in an indi-
vidual farmer’s exposure to different export tax regimes: a time variation and a
cross-sectional variation. Before the division of Côte d’Ivoire into two administra-
tive and political blocks, a uniform cocoa tariff system prevailed across all the 58
départements - or provinces - of the country. It is only after the apparition of the
Forces Nouvelles in September 2002, along with their military and political capa-
bilities to conquer and administer a significant portion of the national territory,
that dichotomous export tax policies surfaced. While in the government-controlled
south, the export tax on cocoa was maintained at 220 FCFA ($0.44) per kilogram,
tariff rates fluctuated between 50 FCFA ($0.10) and 150 FCFA ($0.30) per kilogram
in the rebel-held north (Witness 2007).
To identify the effects on cocoa farmers of the preferential export tax policy im-
plemented in Northern CI, I employ principally the DDD approach. This empirical
strategy is meant to control for any confounding factors affecting cocoa farmers’ con-
sumption patterns in Northern CI that are not caused, albeit correlated with, the
export tax policy. First, exploiting the time and cross-sectional nature of the policy,
I include both the year and state effects to absorb time trends and state-specific dif-
ferences in consumption. Then, to immune the impact of the policy on consumption
against state-specific shocks that coincided with its implementation in the experi-
mental state, I also include state-by-year effects. In other words, I contrast changes
in consumption expenditure between the treated group (cocoa farmers) and a con-
trol group (non-cocoa farmers) in the treatment state (Northern CI), with changes
in consumption between a pair of untreated groups (cocoa farmers vs. non-cocoa
farmers) in the control state (Southern CI).
To refine the identification of the impact of the export tax policy on consump-
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tion, I also use a sub-sample of communities that resided in districts located on both
sides of the demarcation line separating the two states. Because district creation
often obeys certain socio-economic, cultural and geographic coherences, treated and
control groups from these split districts would have the advantage of being more
comparable. Here, I exploit the idea that, beyond shared observable and unobserv-
able characteristics, one fundamental difference between farmers residing in these
split districts was their exposure to different export tax policies.
To sum up, the percentage difference in export tax between the low and high tar-
iff areas during the crisis was on average about 75%. Using a repeated cross-section,
I aim at quantifying the effects of the tariff reduction in the experimental territory
(Northern CI) on the living standards of the treated group (cocoa farmers). For
two main reasons, I hypothesize that it was unlikely that farmers’ exposure to low
tariff would have been influenced by either their observed and unobserved charac-
teristics. First, before the recognition of the state borders by the Linas-Marcoussis
peace agreement, there were several occurrences of territorial shifts between the
belligerents.11 The cases of Man and Daloa, described in section 1.2.1, are two good
examples. Second, the preferential export tax policy introduced in Northern CI was
not intended to help the farmers. Instead, it was motivated by the Forces Nouvelles’
own self-interest for tax resources (Guesnet, Müller & Schure 2010). This argument
can be challenged by conjectures suggesting that the armed conflict in Côte d’Ivoire
was a revolution of the northerners (Mande Northern and Voltaique) against the
southerners (Akan, Krou and Mande Southern). But, looking at the ethnic compo-
sition of cocoa farmers in Northern CI weakens the underlying hypothesis suggesting
that the policy could have been introduced for ethnic favoritism. In fact, it is clear
from the summary statistics (Panel C, Column 9) that southern ethnicities such as
11On January 26th 2003 the protagonists of the Ivorian Crisis signed a peace deal under the
supervision of the international community, including France and the United Nations. A buffer
zone, known as la zone de confiance, which defined the demarcation between the two territories
was formed along the frontline and placed under the surveillance of the UN and French soldiers.
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the Mandé Southern (41%) and the Krou (27%) are the dominant groups in cocoa
farming in Northern CI.
1.4 Export Taxes and Consumption: The Causal
Link
1.4.1 Preliminary Evidence
In table 1.2, I report the standard difference-in-difference (DD) estimation of the
impact of export tax reduction on cocoa farmers’ consumption expenditure. In
panels A and B, I compare changes in the logarithm of consumption expenditure for
cocoa farmers in Northern CI (treatment state) to that for cocoa farmers in Southern
CI (control state). More specifically, as panel A examines changes in consumption
using the sample of cocoa farmers from all districts, panel B focuses essentially on
the subsample of cocoa farmers from the split districts in which individuals farmers
are relatively more comparable than farmers from all districts. To test the validity of
my identification hypothesis, I finally compare changes in consumption expenditure
within a placebo subsample of cocoa farmers who were not exposed to the new
export tax policy (panel C).
The results from both panel A and B are quite similar statistically and qualita-
tively. On the one hand, there was a significant increase in per capita consumption
expenditure in both the treatment and control states. For example, in the subsample
of split districts, the within-state logarithm of per capita consumption expenditure
increased by about 0.784 in Northern CI, and by about 0.378 in Southern CI. On
the other hand, per capita consumption expenditure remained relatively higher in
the non-experimental state (Southern CI) than the experimental state (Northern
CI). In particular, before the implementation of the new export tax policy (pre-
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Table 1.2: Standard Difference-in-Differences
[1] [2] [3]
Pre-Partition Post-Partition Within-State Difference
Panel A: All Districts
1. Northern CI (Treatment State) 10.349 11.133 0.783***
(0.048) (0.047) (0.067)
[384] [349]
2. Southern CI (Control State) 10.910 11.283 0.372***
(0.022) (0.019) (0.029)
[1758] [2400]




Panel B: Split Districts
1. Northern CI (Treatment State) 10.347 11.132 0.784***
(0.048) (0.049) (0.069)
[380] [313]
2. Southern CI (Control State) 10.781 11.160 0.378***
(0.032) (0.033) (0.046)
[636] [780]




Panel C: Falsification (Experiment Control)
1. Split Southern CI 10.781 11.160 0.378***
(0.032) (0.033) (0.046)
[636] [780]
2. Non-Split Southern CI 10.983 11.342 0.359***
(0.029) (0.023) (0.036)
[1122] [1620]




Notes: Column 3 reports the within-state difference in consumption expenditure which is the
post-partition expenditure minus the pre-partition expenditure for the state identified in each row.
The third row of each panel reports the cross-state (or cross-district) difference in consumption
expenditure (example: row 3 = row 1 - row 2). The difference-in-differences reported in the fourth
row of each panel is the post-partition cross-state difference minus the pre-partition cross-state
difference. Alternatively, it can be obtained by subtracting the change in expenditure in Southern
CI (or Non-Split Southern CI) from the change in expenditure in Northern CI (or Split Southern
CI). Standards errors are in parenthesis and number of observations are in brackets. ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗
denote statistical significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Data Source: ENV (2002) and ENV (2008).
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partition period), the logarithm of consumption expenditure of cocoa farmers in the
split districts of Northern CI was 0.434 lower than that of their peers in Southern
CI. But, this difference in consumption expenditure dropped to 0.028 after the new
export tax policy was implemented in Northern CI. Overall, these results suggest
that exposure to low export taxes not only improved significantly cocoa farmers’
living standards, but it also contributed to shrink the pre-partition consumption
gap that existed between cocoa farmers across states.
Estimates of the effects of the export tax reduction are displayed in row 4 of
panels A and B. Thus, for the split districts (panel B), the DD estimate of the impact
of the new export tax policy on the logarithm of consumption expenditures is about
0.406. It is positive and highly statistically significant. Economically, it suggests
that there was approximatively a 50 percent relative increase in the consumption
expenditure of cocoa farmers in Northern CI. To test whether the then identified
effect of the policy is vulnerable to different time trends across territories, I conduct
a falsification exercise using a pool of cocoa farmers drawn from the control state
(Southern CI).
In panel C, I present the results of this placebo test. I compare, in particular,
changes in the logarithm of per capita consumption expenditure of cocoa farm-
ers in Southern CI selected from the sample of split and non-split districts. The
difference-in-differences estimate for these two untreated groups of cocoa farmers
is not significantly different from 0 (row 4 of panel C). This suggests that the ef-
fect of the policy on cocoa farmers’ living standards, is less likely to suffer from an
identification issue.
To complement the results from the DD estimation in table 1.2, I present in
table 1.3 the DDD estimates of the impact of export taxes on consumption. In
panel A, I contrast relative changes in consumption among a pair of treated and
untreated cocoa farmers, which belong to Northern and Southern CI, respectively.
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Before the partition, cocoa farmers in Northern CI lagged considerably, in terms
of consumption, behind their peers from Southern CI. But, after the partition the
consumption gap (in logarithm terms) drops from 0.561 to 0.150. Thus, this result
suggests that the fall in export taxes improved relative consumption for cocoa farm-
ers in Northern CI by approximately 50%. This is by construction equivalent to the
DD estimation previously obtained in panel A of table 1.2.
One limitation of the DD estimate obtained in both table 1.2 and panel A of
table 1.3 is its vulnerability to heterogenous time trends across states. For example,
resources reallocation following the partition could have triggered disproportionate
tax collection in Southern CI to the detriment of cocoa farmers. To test this hy-
pothesis of non-parallel time trends across states, I compare in panel B of table
1.3 relative changes in consumption using a pair of untreated groups from each
state. The DD estimation from this control group suggests that non-cocoa farmers
in Northern CI experienced a relative increase in consumption of about 5.23%. This
is clear indication that taking into account state-specific consumption shocks is ap-
pealing for identifying the effect of the export tax relief on farmers’ living standards.
Overall, the DDD estimation obtained from subtracting the DD in panel B from
the DD in panel A suggests that the fall in export taxes was accompanied by a
relatively significant increase in consumption for cocoa farmers in Northern CI. The
magnitude of this relative gain in well-being was about 43%. In what follows, I
exploit the availability of a rich set of information from the ENV survey, at both
the household and individual levels, to extend this analysis to a regression frame-
work. Such a strategy has the advantage of taking into account other measurable
individual-level characteristics and/or unobservable province and district specific
factors that may influence rural households’ living standards.
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Table 1.3: Standard Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences
[1] [2] [3]
Pre-Partition Post-Partition Time Difference
Panel A: Cocoa Farmers (Treatment Group)
1. Northern CI (Treatment State) 10.349 11.133 0.783***
(0.048) (0.047) (0.067)
[384] [349]
2. Southern CI (Control State) 10.910 11.283 0.372***
(0.022) (0.019) (0.029)
[1758] [2400]




Panel B: Other Farmers (Control Group)
1. Northern CI (Treatment State) 10.383 10.704 0.320***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.015)
[8009] [8347]
2. Southern CI (Control State) 10.801 11.070 0.269***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.012)
[10236] [16089]






Notes: The fourth row of each panel compares cross-states relative changes in consumption among
cocoa farmers (panel A) and non-cocoa farmers (panel B). The difference between these relative DD
estimates gives the DDD estimation of the impact of export taxes on cocoa farmers’ consumption,
displayed in bold at the bottom of table 1.3. Standards errors are in parenthesis and number
of observations are in brackets. ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ denote statistical significant at 10%, 5% and 1%,
respectively.
Data Source: ENV (2002) and ENV (2008).
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1.4.2 Regression DDD Specification
To further examine the causal link between export taxes on cocoa beans and individ-
ual cocoa producer’s living standards, I estimate variants of the following regression
à la Gruber (1994), where the response variable is log per capita consumption ex-
penditure in constant domestic currency of farmer i from household h located in
province p at time t:
Yihpt = α + λ1Libi + λ2Postt + λ3Cocoai + γ1(Libi · Postt) + γ2(Cocoai · Postt)




htβz + βp + εihpt.
(1.1)
Unlike the standard approaches presented in tables 1.2 and 1.3, this specification
offers more flexibility in terms of integrating additional covariates that may affect the
farmer’s living standard, as measured by his consumption expenditure. The terms
α and βp are the constant and the province fixed effects, respectively. The province
fixed effects control for hard-to-account-for local institutional and cultural features
as well as time-invariant geographic factors that may affect the farmer’s earnings
and expenditures. The vector X ′i summarizes the individual farmer controls, such
as his ethnic and religious affiliations, while the vector Z ′ht incorporates controls for
both the household itself and the characteristics of the household’s head. Controls
at the household level include the size of the household, and dummies for rural
residency and cement tile floor. For the head of the household, I include his age and
dummies for gender, marital status, literacy (whether he can read and/or write)
and ownership of mobile phone.
Libi, Postt and Cocoai are dummy variables for the liberalization-friendly state,
the post-partition time period, and an identifier for individual cocoa farmers, re-
spectively. Including these dummies separately in equation 1.1 aims at disentangling
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their exclusive effects on consumption. These include the experimental state fixed
effects (λ1), the post-partition variation in consumption (λ2), and consumption pat-
terns specific to cocoa farmers (λ3). Consistent with the DDD tradition, the model
in equation 1.1 also takes into account the interaction effects of these indicator vari-
ables. In particular, while γ1, the coefficient of the interaction term Libi · Postt,
absorbs time-specific changes in consumption in the experimental state, the coeffi-
cient γ2 on the interaction term Cocoai · Postt aims at controlling for the overall
time-variation in cocoa farmers’ consumption. Finally, γ3, the coefficient of the term
Libi ·Cocoai captures time-invariant consumption patterns specific to cocoa farmers
in the experimental state (Northern CI).
The measure of interest in this DDD empirical exercise is the coefficient δ of the
triple interaction term Libi · Cocoai · Postt. This coefficient captures the magni-
tude of the causal effect of export tax reduction on cocoa farmers’ living standards,
as measured by per capita consumption expenditure. It bears such an economic
interpretation because it compares cross-states differences in consumption between
cocoa farmers and other farmers before and after the implementation of the prefer-
ential export tax policy. To close the presentation of the model in equation 1.1, I
define εihpt as an idiosyncratic error term. In all specifications, I follow Cameron,
Gelbach & Miller (2011) and report cluster-robust standard errors at the household
and census block levels. This approach accounts for arbitrary correlation across
individual-level observations within both the households and census blocks.
1.4.3 Main Findings
In table 1.4, I report estimates of variant specifications of equation 1.1. The DDD
estimates using a specification unconditional to household controls and to any dis-
aggregated location (district and province) fixed effects are displayed in column 1.
Column 2 presents the results including individual-level and household-level con-
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Table 1.4: Regression Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences
Dependent variable is log total consumption expenditure
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Lib -0.418*** -0.282*** -0.750*** -0.282*** -0.283***
(0.048) (0.051) (0.076) (0.050) (0.052)
Post 0.269*** 0.288*** 0.357*** 0.424*** 0.362***
(0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.091) (0.071)
Cocoa 0.109*** 0.084*** 0.036 0.100*** 0.098***
(0.033) (0.030) (0.024) (0.029) (0.030)
Lib · Post 0.051 0.011 -0.085 0.417*** -0.245
(0.076) (0.075) (0.070) (0.150) (0.248)
Cocoa · Post 0.103** 0.030 0.018 -0.041 -0.050
(0.045) (0.044) (0.037) (0.042) (0.041)
Lib · Cocoa -0.144* -0.137* -0.105* -0.112 -0.111
(0.078) (0.081) (0.060) (0.080) (0.081)
Lib · Cocoa · Post 0.360*** 0.459*** 0.478*** 0.250** 0.206**
(0.117) (0.119) (0.111) (0.111) (0.099)
Constant 10.801*** 10.790*** 10.732*** 10.733*** 10.693***
(0.027) (0.085) (0.107) (0.081) (0.086)
Observations 47572 43432 43432 43432 43432
Adjusted R2 0.074 0.186 0.246 0.218 0.241
Household Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE No No Yes No No
Survey-Round-District FE No No No Yes No
Survey-Round-Province FE No No No No Yes
Notes: Two-way cluster-robust standard errors at the household and census block levels are re-
ported in parentheses. The dependent variable is per capita total consumption. ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ denote
statistical significant of the coefficient at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Data Source: ENV (2002) and ENV (2008).
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trols, but without controlling for district-level and province-level fixed effects. In
columns 3-5, I estimate the effect of export taxes on consumption using a variety of
estimation strategies robust to the inclusion of diverse fixed effects. These include
province fixed effects (column 3), survey-round-district fixed effects (column 4) and
survey-round-province-fixed effects (column 5). Both the survey-round district and
province fixed effects have the advantage to compare cocoa farmers to other farm-
ers within the same location (district or province) pre and post partition across
states. The DDD estimates are positive and statistically significant across specifi-
cations. For example, the results based on the specification with individual-level,
household-level and province fixed effects (column 3) suggest that exposure to low
export taxes was accompanied with an increase in relative consumption of about
61%. Comparing the beneficiaries of the tax relief to others within the same loca-
tion, the magnitude of the impact of export taxes on consumption varies between
28% (column 4) and 23% (column 5).
In table 1.5, I examine potential heterogeneity, induced by the export tax relief,
across categories of consumption spending. More specifically, I estimate the effects of
the policy on investment in education and health, inter-household transfers, basics
needs such as food and clothing, and other types of spending including leisure,
transportation, etc. In addition to the full sample based on all districts (panel A),
I also report results using the subsample of districts split between the two de facto
states (panel B). In each specification from column 1 to column 6, I control for both
the household controls (individual-level and household-level) and the province fixed
effects. Although column 1 of panel A has been previously discussed (see column 3 of
table 1.4), I report it to contrast its results from the estimates based on split districts
(column 1 of panel B). Except for investment in education, estimates based on the
full sample are positive and significant for the other categories of spending. As for
the split districts, the results are qualitatively similar to the full sample case in panel
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Table 1.5: Regression Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
Total Education Health Transfer Clothing Food Other
Panel A: All Districts
Lib -0.750*** -0.529** -0.306 0.117 -0.603*** -0.486*** -0.369
(0.076) (0.229) (0.238) (0.647) (0.088) (0.067) (0.288)
Post 0.357*** 0.396*** 0.374*** 0.625*** 0.402*** 0.071 0.546***
(0.040) (0.063) (0.070) (0.074) (0.045) (0.046) (0.056)
Cocoa 0.036 -0.029 0.140** 0.034 0.082*** 0.042* 0.070
(0.024) (0.041) (0.054) (0.055) (0.025) (0.023) (0.044)
Lib · Post -0.085 0.036 0.115 0.071 0.062 -0.172** -0.224**
(0.070) (0.098) (0.138) (0.107) (0.069) (0.073) (0.107)
Cocoa · Post 0.018 0.112* -0.019 0.037 -0.053 -0.034 -0.042
(0.037) (0.059) (0.066) (0.069) (0.037) (0.034) (0.068)
Lib · Cocoa -0.105* 0.220** -0.070 -0.067 -0.084 -0.202*** -0.175**
(0.060) (0.096) (0.100) (0.135) (0.075) (0.072) (0.089)
Lib · Cocoa · Post 0.478*** -0.235 0.369*** 0.528*** 0.304*** 0.440*** 0.450***
(0.111) (0.157) (0.143) (0.186) (0.096) (0.108) (0.163)
Constant 10.732*** 8.188*** 7.750*** 8.551*** 9.762*** 9.662*** 8.110***
(0.107) (0.164) (0.174) (0.180) (0.136) (0.097) (0.166)
Observations 43432 21831 29627 35941 41352 43363 42871
Adjusted R2 0.246 0.202 0.117 0.199 0.182 0.297 0.157
Panel B: Split Districts
Lib -0.232 0.189 0.192 0.754 -0.306 -1.043*** -0.241
(0.212) (0.328) (0.314) (0.651) (0.287) (0.402) (0.787)
Post 0.351*** 0.321*** 0.401*** 0.809*** 0.441*** -0.005 0.629***
(0.049) (0.085) (0.103) (0.094) (0.052) (0.060) (0.070)
Cocoa 0.095*** -0.006 0.104 0.112** 0.098** 0.027 0.129**
(0.034) (0.055) (0.072) (0.048) (0.043) (0.028) (0.060)
Lib · Post 0.099 0.081 0.239 0.053 0.189* 0.163* -0.270*
(0.094) (0.120) (0.177) (0.150) (0.102) (0.092) (0.148)
Cocoa · Post 0.029 0.153 0.091 0.103 -0.019 0.025 -0.089
(0.060) (0.103) (0.093) (0.100) (0.073) (0.050) (0.098)
Lib · Cocoa -0.101* 0.181* 0.006 -0.061 -0.038 -0.094 -0.243**
(0.061) (0.108) (0.113) (0.128) (0.076) (0.070) (0.099)
Lib · Cocoa · Post 0.332*** -0.250 0.110 0.278 0.115 0.189* 0.508**
(0.114) (0.168) (0.146) (0.187) (0.113) (0.109) (0.201)
Constant 10.261*** 8.097*** 6.544*** 8.028*** 9.660*** 9.782*** 7.347***
(0.162) (0.350) (0.275) (0.291) (0.257) (0.372) (0.406)
Observations 22469 11402 15639 18390 21481 22427 22174
Adjusted R2 0.220 0.168 0.115 0.209 0.176 0.268 0.131
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Two-way cluster-robust standard errors at the household and census block levels are re-
ported in parentheses. Dependent variables are log per capita consumption by categories of spend-
ing displayed in each column. In all specifications, province fixed effects, household-level and
individual-level controls are included. ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ denote statistical significant of the coefficient at
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Data Source: ENV (2002) and ENV (2008).
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A, but only the coefficients on total expenditure, food and other types of spending
are statistically significant. Estimates based on all districts (panel A in table 1.5)
suggest that export tax relief induced an increase in log per capita expenditure
for health (0.369), transfer (0.528), clothing (0.304), food (0.440) and other types
of expenditure such as leisure and transportation (0.450). As for investment in
education, its coefficient is negative (-0.235) but statistically insignificant.12
So far, the results from the parametric empirical analysis suggest that the im-
plementation of a preferential export tax treatment in Northern CI, between 2002
and 2007, turned out to be revenue-enhancing for cocoa farmers. Where export tax
reduction occurred, the mean of the overall consumption spending went up. This
improvement in consumption was associated with higher spending in health, nutri-
tion, clothing, inter-household transfers, etc. The gain in living standards for cocoa
farmers is consistent with the nonparametric results in figure 1.2. Moreover, an
attentive scrutiny of the kernel density in the upper panel of figure 1.2 reveals that
the export tax policy also had important distributional effects. The effect seems to
be more pronounced in the lower tail of the distribution, suggesting that poorest
farmers in Northern CI benefited relatively more from the tax reduction than the
wealthiest farmers. In the next subsection, I explore this potential heterogeneity in
the impact of the export tax policy on consumption.
12The apparent negative but statistically insignificant effect of export tax alleviation on in-
vestment in education can be explained by several factors. First, as pointed out by Sany (2010),
more than 50% of school-aged children were out of school between 2002 and 2004 in Northern CI.
Second, local and international NGOs, with the support of UNICEF, filled the void left by the
official government in the educational system, and often provided cost-saving incentives to parents
in order to encourage enrollment. Finally, it could be the case that favorable conditions in the
cocoa sector, including the pecuniary opportunities they offer, pull children away from schools
towards cocoa fields (Nkamleu & Kielland 2006).
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1.4.4 Distributional Effects
An important aspect of the expenditure distribution in figure 1.2 (top panel), is that
the lower-tail inequality between cocoa farmers across states significantly decreased
over time. To closely investigate potential distributional effects of the export tax
reduction, that may not be captured by mean estimators, I rely on a quantile esti-
mation strategy. More specifically, I estimate the effect of the policy on the median
and both the lower and upper quarters. Median estimators are thought to be more
well-suited than mean estimators in dealing with outliers. But, looking specifically
at upper and lower expenditure quantiles provides a good assessment on how the
liberalization policy under investigation affects inequality across farm households.
In columns 1-3 of table 1.6, I report the coefficients from the quantile regression
estimation for the first (τ = 0.25), second (τ = 0.50) and third (τ = 0.75) quarters
of expenditure. To contrast the quantile estimates from the previous results, I report
in column 4 the coefficients from the least squares estimation. In all specifications,
I control for all the relevant individual-level and household-level characteristics pre-
viously defined as well as for province fixed effects. Overall, the results suggest
that reducing export taxes on cocoa beans had positive and statistically significant
effects on expenditure at all quarters of distribution examined. But, more specifi-
cally, the effects of the policy on conditional distributions vary in magnitude across
expenditure groups. The overall tendency, for both the full sample and the subsam-
ple of split districts, is that the impact of export tax on consumption decreases as
the quantiles increase. For example, both the results based on all districts and the
split districts indicate that the first quarter coefficients are significantly higher than
the third quarter coefficients. As for the median coefficients, while being slightly
lower than the first quarter coefficients, they are similar to the OLS coefficients.
These results suggest that poor farm households benefited relatively more from the
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Table 1.6: Distributional Effects
Quantile Regression Estimates
[1] [2] [3] [4]
τ = 0.25 τ = 0.50 τ = 0.75 OLS Estimates
Panel A: All Districts
Lib -0.528 -0.479 -0.161 -0.750***
(0.380) (0.555) (0.327) (0.076)
Cocoa 0.017 0.042 0.051** 0.036
(0.027) (0.032) (0.022) (0.024)
Lib · Cocoa -0.065 -0.111 -0.061 -0.105*
(0.090) (0.083) (0.079) (0.060)
Post 0.373*** 0.359*** 0.379*** 0.357***
(0.044) (0.052) (0.042) (0.040)
Lib · Post -0.101 0.046 -0.035 -0.085
(0.094) (0.084) (0.071) (0.070)
Cocoa · Post 0.021 -0.024 -0.007 0.018
(0.037) (0.039) (0.035) (0.037)
Lib · Cocoa · Post 0.568*** 0.468*** 0.251** 0.478***
(0.150) (0.132) (0.102) (0.111)
Constant 10.202*** 10.745*** 11.228*** 10.732***
(0.111) (0.105) (0.092) (0.107)
Observations 43432 43432 43432 43432
Panel B: Split Districts
Lib -0.277 -0.335 -0.005 -0.232
(0.543) (0.522) (0.801) (0.212)
Cocoa 0.067* 0.077** 0.059** 0.095***
(0.040) (0.036) (0.027) (0.034)
Lib · Cocoa -0.067 -0.095 0.008 -0.101*
(0.078) (0.080) (0.071) (0.061)
Post 0.347*** 0.400*** 0.409*** 0.351***
(0.063) (0.060) (0.052) (0.049)
Lib · Post 0.086 0.201** 0.118 0.099
(0.118) (0.100) (0.095) (0.094)
Cocoa · Post 0.027 -0.022 0.038 0.029
(0.066) (0.055) (0.069) (0.060)
Lib · Cocoa · Post 0.474*** 0.317** 0.076 0.332***
(0.179) (0.130) (0.122) (0.114)
Constant 9.789*** 10.456*** 11.074*** 10.261***
(0.487) (0.246) (0.476) (0.162)
Observations 22469 22469 22469 22469
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: One-way cluster-robust standard errors at the census block level are reported in
parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ denote statistical significant of the coefficient at 10%, 5% and
1%, respectively.
Data Source: ENV (2002) and ENV (2008).
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export tax reduction than households at the upper-tail of the income distribution.
Also noteworthy is the fact while the coefficient of the third quarter is statistically
significant at 1% in the full sample case, it is insignificantly different from 0 in the
case of the split regions.
1.4.5 Robustness Checks
In addition to the placebo test presented in panel C of table 1.2, I reinvestigate the
validity of my identification strategy by conducting a series of falsification exercises.
In particular, I estimate the following equation using different samples of individuals
that were not directly exposed to the favorable export tax policy:




htβz + εihpt. (1.2)
Here, the outcome variable is log per capita consumption expenditure in constant
domestic currency for a given individual i from household h located in province p
at time t. The idea is to check, for other farmers (especially non-cocoa farmers),
whether being a resident of the experimental state (Northern CI) was associated
with an increase in the living standards. If the relationship between consumption
expenditure for non-cocoa producers and residency in Northern CI appears to be
insignificantly different from zero, then this would suggest that my identification
strategy is valid.
Table 1.7 presents the results of the various falsification tests. Equation 1.2 is
estimated using respectively all farmers (including cocoa farmers) and subsample
of farmers without cocoa farmers. As before, the results using all districts are
distinguished from the results based on the split districts. I also include household
controls and province fixed effects in all specifications. In columns 1-2, I compare
the overall change in the logarithm of per capita consumption expenditure for the
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Table 1.7: Falsification Exercise
Including Cocoa Farmers Excluding Cocoa Farmers
All Districts Split Districts All Districts Split Districts
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Lib -0.773*** -0.225 -0.758*** -0.029
(0.074) (0.211) (0.079) (0.511)
Post 0.358*** 0.355*** 0.349*** 0.353***
(0.040) (0.050) (0.040) (0.049)
Lib · Post -0.065 0.120 -0.078 0.096
(0.069) (0.094) (0.070) (0.094)
Constant 10.737*** 10.263*** 10.734*** 10.410***
(0.107) (0.161) (0.111) (0.342)
Observations 43432 22469 38832 20530
Adjusted R2 0.244 0.218 0.241 0.216
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Two-way cluster-robust standard errors at the household and census block levels are re-
ported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the logarithm of per capita total consumption
expenditure in constant domestic currency. In all specifications, province fixed effects, households
and individual farmer’s characteristics are included. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote statistical significant of the
coefficient at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Data Source: ENV (2002) and ENV (2008).
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residents of Northern CI to that of the residents of Southern CI, including the
cocoa farmers from both states. In columns 3-4, I reexamine the same difference-in-
differences, with the exception that cocoa farmers are excluded. In all specifications,
the estimated coefficients are all not significantly different from zero. This suggests
that residency in Northern CI was not itself a source of income gain for both farmers.
In other words, my identification strategy cannot be rejected by these placebo tests.
Perhaps the identified improvement in cocoa farmers’ living standards in North-
ern CI, documented in previous sections, is explained by alternative factors unrelated
to the liberalization policy. These include for example differences in production, pro-
ductivity, size of cropland, availability of labor and time allocation to farming. To
examine this hypothesis, I reestimate equation 1.1 using these potential factors as
outcomes variables. The rationale here is to shed light on any probable comparative
advantage that goes with cocoa farming in Northern CI beyond the fact that this
state benefited from a liberalization policy.
In panel A of table 1.8, estimates from the DDD strategy suggest that farmers
in Northern CI did not devote more time to farming relatively to their counterparts
in Southern CI (column 1). Moreover, I find no evidence that neither production
(column 2) nor productivity (column 3) of cocoa beans in Northern CI were relatively
higher. In table 1.8, farmers were asked whether they had hired more labor (panel
B) and had increased the size of their cropland (panel C) between the last harvest
and the date of the interview. For each question, the motivations of their choice
should be specified. In case they answered in the affirmative, the motivations varied
from “availability of labor” to “increase in farm-gate prices”. As shown in column
1 of panel B and C, cocoa farmers in Northern CI reported that had hired more
labor and had increased the size of their cropland in comparison to cocoa farmers
in Southern CI. Interestingly, they also reported that relative favorable farm-gate
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prices justified these outcomes (column 3 in panel B and C)13. In the next section, I
investigate one relevant mechanism, price pass-through, underlying the association
between the alleviation of export restrictions and the living standards of agricultural
households.
1.5 Mechanism: Price Pass-Through
1.5.1 A Basic Model
In this subsection, I introduce a simple theoretical framework that sheds light on the
welfare implications of trade reforms in an underdeveloped agricultural economy. It
complements a large body of research that has identified the transmission of border
prices to local farmers as an important mechanism through which trade liberalization
enhances social welfare (see for example Porto (2006), and Winters, McCulloch &
McKay (2004)). Conceptually, the most closely related model is Casaburi & Reed
(2013), who draw on Chaudhuri & Banerjee (2004). Unlike these authors, who
capture trade reforms by export or credit subsidies, I consider trade liberalization
through the lens of export tax incentives.
I consider a large economy with significant market power in the production of
an agricultural commodity. The economy is divided into two separate oligopsonistic
markets m = {n, s}, populated each with a large number of farmers Fm and a small
number of homogeneous traders Tm. Although land and crop yield are assumed to
be equally distributed across markets, they vary across farmers within each market.
An individual farmer i receives the average market price pm per unit of output ymi
sold to a trader operating in market m. The trader in turn sells the product in the
13It is worth noting that it takes at least five years for a cocoa tree to produce cocoa beans.
Therefore, increasing the size of cropland between two harvest seasons should not necessarily
translate into more production. This suggests that the results regarding no significant difference
in production (panel A) and increase in the size of cropland (panel C) are not contradictory.
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Table 1.8: Alternative Potential Driving Factors
[1] [2] [3]
Panel A
Time Worked Output Productivity
All Regions -0.433 -0.077 0.131
(2.108) (0.109) (0.164)
Observations 37656 16426 12562
Adjusted R2 0.074 0.188 0.126
Split Regions -4.571* -0.105 0.175
(2.442) (0.120) (0.189)
Observations 19312 7007 5351
Adjusted R2 0.063 0.168 0.160
Panel B
Hired More Workers Why?
Available Labor High Sales Price
All Regions 0.132*** 0.034 0.077*
(0.049) (0.120) (0.042)
Observations 12129 3862 3862
Adjusted R2 0.057 0.112 0.106
Split Regions 0.066 0.001 0.015
(0.076) (0.161) (0.038)
Observations 6088 2090 2090
Adjusted R2 0.074 0.128 0.061
Panel C
Increased Cropland Size Why?
Available Labor High Sales Price
All Regions 0.189*** -0.025 0.298***
(0.045) (0.097) (0.079)
Observations 43276 11787 11787
Adjusted R2 0.057 0.073 0.085
Split Regions 0.125** -0.032 0.184**
(0.055) (0.102) (0.093)
Observations 22375 6581 6581
Adjusted R2 0.031 0.063 0.076
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes
Province Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Two-way cluster-robust standard errors at the household and census block levels are re-
ported in parentheses. In panel A, dependent variables are: weekly hours worked in farming
(column 1), log of output produced in kg (column 2), log (output/cropland size) (column 3). In
panel B and C, dependent variables are dummies for hiring more labor, increasing cropland size
(column 1), availability of labor (column 2), and higher farm-gate prices (column 3). In all speci-
fications, province fixed effects, households and individual farmer’s characteristics are included. ∗,
∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ denote statistical significant of the coefficient at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Data Source: ENV (2002) and ENV (2008).
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international market at per unit wholesale price pw. Since each trader is assumed
to exert a degree of monopsony power, the per unit price to which the commodity
is purchased from farmers is given by:
pm = pw(1− τm)− fm, (1.3)
where τm and fm are the market-specific export tax rate levied by the government
and transactions costs, respectively. The latter includes transport costs and other
charges incurred by the trader. In this model, the degree of trade liberalization
prevailing in the economy is captured by the degree of export tax incentive. In
particular, market n is said to be more liberalized than market s if τn < τ s.
Whenever a transaction occurs in market m, the utility enjoyed by farmer i who
sells his produce at the average unitary price pm can be written as:
umi = [p
w(1− τm)− fm]ymi . (1.4)





um f (y) dy , (1.5)
where f(y) denotes the probability density function (pdf) of the land output y with
support over the interval [yL, yH ].
Combining equations 1.4 and 1.5, I can derive the difference in changes in average
welfare across markets in response to a change in international price pw. Under the






= E[y](τn − τ s). (1.6)
According to equation 1.6, in response to an increase in international price, farmers
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transacting in low export tax environments tend to experience a more rapid increase
in average welfare. This simple theoretical intuition is consistent with the empirical
findings I have documented so far in the previous sections. If, for example, τn
and τ s denote respectively the export tax rates in Northern CI and Southern CI
with τn < τ s, then equation 1.6 would suggest that cocoa farmers in Northern CI
are more likely to be better off than their Southern CI’s counterparts following a
positive price shock in the international market.
One potential channel the literature has identified as an important factor through
which favorable international market conditions can translate into increasing welfare
is the price pass-through mechanism. To see this, I compare changes in prices across






= τn − τ s. (1.7)
Equation 1.7 not only suggests that price pass-through is more pronounced in low
export tax environments, but it also implies that the transmission of international
prices to local farmers is an important mechanism through which trade liberalization
improves living standards. This intuition becomes obvious when I combine equations













In the next subsection, I investigate empirically the hypothesis that exposure to low
export tax was accompanied by an increase in farm-gate prices received by farmers.
1.5.2 Empirical Evidence
To formally investigate the price mechanism predicted in the basic model above,
I start by comparing in table 1.9 farm-gate prices received by local farmers across
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states. As before, I consider both the sample of cocoa farmers in all districts (panel
A) and the subsample of cocoa farmers in the split districts (panel B). Overall
the results indicate in both cases a fall in per kilogram farm-gate prices over time.
Nonetheless, farmers exposed to low export tax experienced a relatively less severe
decrease in prices compared to farmers residing in high export tax jurisdictions. The
estimates from the difference-in-differences suggest that a cocoa farmer in Northern
CI (treatment state) received on average between 38.93 FCFA (all districts) and
39.73 FCFA (split districts) more for each kilogram of cocoa sold. Again the placebo
in panel C of table 1.9 supports the validity of the identification strategy.
To complement the inquiry on the price pass-through mechanism, I also estimate
the following equation:
Priceihpt = c+ σp + θ0Libi + θ1Postt + θ2(Libi · Postt) +W
′
iσx + εihpt, (1.9)
where Priceihpt is the price received by cocoa farmer i from household h located in
province p at time t. While the terms Libi, Postt and Libi · Postt are defined as
before, the terms c, σp and εihpt represent the constant, the province fixed effects and
the error term, respectively. As in the previous difference-in-differences regressions,
standard errors are clustered at the household and census block levels. The vector
W
′
i includes a set of household level control variables such as the age and gender of
the head as well as indicators for a rural area, literacy and ownership of a mobile
phone, and cement or tile floor.
Table 1.10 presents estimates from equation 1.9. In columns 1-3 and 4-6, I re-
port the results using the sample for all districts and the subsample for the split
districts. Consistent with the results from table 1.9, exposure to low export tax was
accompanied by a significant increase in farm-gate prices received by cocoa farmers
in Northern CI. For example, taking into account both the household characteris-
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Table 1.9: Price Mechanism using Standard Difference-in-Differences
[1] [2] [3]
Pre-Partition Post-Partition Within-State Difference
Panel A: All Districts
1. Northern CI (Treatment State) 484.60 430.12 -54.48***
(7.95) (6.07) (10.04)
[301] [293]
2. Southern CI (Control State) 549.10 455.69 -93.41***
(3.49) (1.77) (3.57)
[1399] [2151]




Panel B: Split Districts
1. Northern CI (Treatment State) 483.32 430.77 -52.55***
(7.91) (6.32) (10.28)
[299] [268]
2. Southern CI (Control State) 528.88 436.60 -92.28***
(5.94) (3.43) (6.47)
[486] [664]




Panel C: Falsification (Experiment Control)
1. Split Southern CI 528.88 436.60 -92.28***
(5.94) (3.43) (6.47)
[486] [664]
2. Non-Split Southern CI 559.86 464.21 -95.65***
(4.28) (2.02) (4.22)
[913] [1487]




Notes: Column 3 reports the within-state difference in per kilogram farm-gate price which is the
post-partition price minus the pre-partition price for the state identified in each row. The third
row of each panel reports the cross-state or cross-district difference in price per kilogram (example:
row 3 = row 1 - row 2). The difference-in-differences reported in the fourth row of each panel is the
post-partition cross-state difference minus the pre-partition cross-state difference. Alternatively,
it can be obtained by subtracting the change in price in Southern CI (or Non-Split Southern CI)
from the change in price in Northern CI (or Split Southern CI). Standards errors are in parentheses
and number of observations are in brackets. ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ denote statistical significant at 10%, 5%
and 1%, respectively.
Data Source: ENV (2002) and ENV (2008).
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tics and the provinces fixed effects (columns 3 and 6), the additional per kilogram
farm-gate prices received by northern cocoa farmers varied between 53 FCFA (all
districts sample) and 64 FCFA (split districts subsample). The latter is equivalent
to approximately 13% of the pooled sample average farm-gate price. This result
suggests that the transmission of border prices to local farmers is a relevant mech-
anism through which export tax incentives improve the living standards of farm
households.
1.6 Conclusion
A large literature has been devoted to the poverty-reducing effects of trade liberaliza-
tion policies [see Winters, McCulloch & McKay (2004)]. Despite their methodolog-
ical rigor, critics have often raised some skepticism about the causal implications
of previous studies. An important issue is the non-randomness of liberalization
policies, which are thought to be the echoes of the influential activities of various
interest groups (Mayer 1984, Trefler 1993). For example, it has been suggested that
farmers in poor countries who are often less educated, less organized and geograph-
ically scattered have a relatively weaker lobbying power on trade issues than their
counterparts in developed nations (Anderson, Hayami & George 1986, Olson 1985).
In this analysis, I exploit a rare opportunity of a ‘natural experiment’, char-
acterized by a temporary coexistence of two de facto ‘states’ in Côte d’Ivoire, to
examine the causal link between the reduction of trade barriers and farm household
consumption. Using both time and cross-sectional variations in export taxes, I show
that exposure to low export taxes on cocoa beans increased the living standards of
cocoa farmers by a significant margin. I also provide evidence that the transmission
of international prices to local producers is one potential mechanism through which
export tax incentives contribute to improved living standards among farm house-
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Table 1.10: Price Mechanism using Regression Difference-in-Difference
All Districts Split Districts
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Lib -64.494*** -65.843*** -74.530*** -45.560** -46.926** -322.553***
(16.751) (16.787) (19.215) (19.552) (19.517) (2.820)
Post -93.410*** -92.155*** -91.196*** -92.276*** -91.170*** -100.175***
(6.967) (6.883) (6.413) (13.421) (13.869) (12.022)
Lib · Post 38.927** 46.538** 53.609*** 39.730* 47.104** 63.796***
(19.782) (19.727) (16.854) (21.838) (21.551) (19.344)
Male -5.033 2.513 -13.458 -10.709
(10.355) (10.933) (15.813) (17.415)
Age -0.077 -0.151 -0.338 -0.374
(0.153) (0.159) (0.281) (0.298)
Literate 7.830** 6.561** 1.404 4.321
(3.357) (3.310) (6.069) (6.732)
Cement/T ile 9.318** 6.070 7.415 -0.672
(3.859) (4.166) (6.093) (5.596)
Mobile 1.500 -2.256 6.960 3.115
(3.726) (3.749) (5.993) (7.909)
Rural 36.415*** 39.204*** 37.561*** 43.652***
(5.917) (6.892) (11.897) (11.535)
Constant 549.097*** 514.880*** 537.733*** 528.876*** 517.518*** 762.330***
(6.167) (14.238) (15.841) (12.287) (32.038) (31.439)
Observations 4144 3910 3910 1717 1582 1582
Adjusted R2 0.152 0.162 0.250 0.117 0.126 0.262
Province FE No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: Two-way cluster-robust standard errors at the household and census block levels are re-
ported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the farm-gate price per kilogram of cocoa received
by each individual farmer. In columns 1-3 and 4-6, estimates using the full-sample, and the sub-
sample of split districts are reported, respectively. In each sub-sample, three specifications are
considered: baseline estimates without any controls (Columns 1, and 4); estimates with house-
hold’s controls such as demographics and wealth proxies (Columns 2, and 5); and estimates with
both household’s controls and province fixed effects (Columns 3, and 6). ∗, ∗∗, ∗ ∗ ∗ denote statis-
tical significant of the coefficient at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Data Source: ENV (2002) and ENV (2008).
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holds. These results suggest that exorbitant export taxes have detrimental effects on
farmers’ earnings and living standards. Thus, non-optimal export taxation can deter
production and ultimately be self-defeating for developing countries, including the
ones with a significant market share in an agricultural commodity (McMillan 2001).
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Chapter 2
Do Good Leaders Produce Bad
Institutions in Africa?
2.1 Introduction
A glance at recent works on comparative development reveals that, while the interest
in the proximate determinants of income is still vivid in the literature, the trajectory
of the intellectual curiosity has progressively shifted towards examining the funda-
mental causes of economic prosperity. At the core of this inquiry, the empirically
well-grounded and quite intuitive institutional hypothesis identifies incentive-driven
societal actions and political organizations as the ultimate causes of economic de-
velopment.1 Beyond their importance for economic outcomes, institutions are also
thought to have a long-lasting effect and an intrinsically durable characteristic. For
example, the seeds for democracy at the state level today may have been sowed be-
fore industrialization at the village level (Giuliano & Nunn 2013). Or, the prevalence
of an adverse pathological environment in former colonies may have induced the in-
troduction of extractive institutions, which is probably the source of contemporary
poor institutional settings (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson 2001). Proponents of
the institutional view have also suggested that disruptive societal choices and/or
historical events - known as critical junctures - may have embarked countries in
different economic and political trajectories.2 Nonetheless, a fewer consensus has
1See Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2005) for a review.
2 Collier & Collier (1993), Daron & Robinson James (2012), among others, discuss the concept
of critical junctures and its relevance for institutional and economic outcomes.
44
emerged from the literature on the specifics that trigger such dichotomous paths.
As some authors have supported that initial wealth (or the lack of it) may have ini-
tiated diverging development trajectories (Engerman & Sokoloff 2002), others have
insinuated that dissimilar paths may follow a major political break such as indepen-
dence (Acemoglu et al. 2008) or the end of Cold War (Villalón & Huxtable 1998).
In this analysis, I contribute to the literature on critical junctures by exploring
a new avenue: the qualitative profile of the African national leaders at indepen-
dence. Since, it has been suggested that “at birth of new polities, leaders mold
institutions”, I argue that the leadership options faced by African nations at inde-
pendence, along with the intrinsic characteristics of these leaders, may have been
a critical step in subsequent political development.3 More specifically, combining
a novel dataset on the ethnic affiliation of the earliest heads of states in Africa
with anthropological information, I document that the first “big men” who inher-
ited traditional egalitarian and democratic norms seem to have been the ones who
transmitted non-democratic practices to their contemporary countrymen. Although
this result seems counter-intuitive and at odds with previous empirical findings that
support an intergenerational transmission of democracy (Giuliano & Nunn 2013),
the historical and political context of Africa may offer some plausible and testable
explanations.
In the African context, this shift in the transmission of institutional capital from
local ethnic groups to contemporary states via the fathers of independence is under-
standable in several regards. For example, it has been argued that early statehood,
which was often accompanied with ethnic institutional development, may have been
an impediment to contemporary political development (Hariri 2012). Also, as sug-
gested by Englebert (2000), the discrepancy between pre-colonial and post-colonial
states in Africa may have incentivized the emergence of non-democratic institutional
3The quote is from Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti (1994) who attributes it to Montesquieu.
45
rules as a strategy to cope with legitimacy issues. For example, Hastings Banda, a
member of the relatively egalitarian Chewa ethnicity from Malawi, ended up being
President for life while holding several ministerial cabinets such as agriculture, for-
eign affairs, justice, and natural resources among others (Jackson & Rosberg 1982).
Without systematically rejecting the transmission channels mentioned above, I
contend that the prospects of accessibility to new resources, which often charac-
terized the formation of new colonial territories beyond ethnic nations, may have
diverted certain rulers from their ethnic institutional norms. In particular, I show
that anticipated resource opportunity - as proxied by proven oil reserves - is one
potential channel through which pre-colonial ethnic institutional capital did not
materialize into contemporary inclusive national polity (Tables 2.7 and ??).
Relying on the institutional profile of the national leaders at independence to
investigate consecutive political development in Africa may entail some endogene-
ity issues. In particular, political organizations and societal traits of certain ethnic
groups may predispose their descendants to be more competitive in the race for
power. Or, it could be the case that unobserved or hard-to-account-for ethnic char-
acteristics may drive the statistical association between leaders’ institutional profile
and political change. To deal with these potential simultaneity or omission con-
cerns, I employ different empirical strategies. First, as in Hariri (2012), I use the
time that has elapsed between the Neolithic Revolution and independence as an in-
strument for pre-colonial ethnic institutional features of the first leaders.4 Because
the transition from nomadic lifestyle to sedentariness could be a relevant proxy for
initial codifications of societal norms, I argue that the timing of the Neolithic Rev-
olution can capture exogenous variation in the acquisition of institutional traits.5
4The Neolithic Revolution is the transition from the nomadism to agriculture and settlement
that several societies experienced in the course of human history.
5By construction the data on the timing of the Neolithic Revolution is country-specific and
not ethnic-specific. Since there is no specific data on when the leaders’ ethnic groups transitioned
from hunter-gathering to agriculture, I use the available country-level data as the proxy for the
ethnicity-level data.
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Using this instrumental variable strategy, I find similar result as the OLS estima-
tion: the legacy of “good” leaders has been “bad” institutions. Second, in addition
to these common empirical strategies (OLS and IV), my findings is not altered when
alternative methods such as fixed effects and difference-in-differences are employed.
As far as I know, this study is the first attempt to establish a link between the
institutional profile of the heads of states - as measured by the pre-colonial institu-
tional traits of their ancestors - and political change. In doing so, it brings a new
insight to the debate on institutional change and comparative development. Beyond
its close affinity with the debate on the importance of history and culture (Gennaioli
& Rainer 2007, Giuliano & Nunn 2013, Michalopoulos & Papaioannou 2013b), this
paper is also related to the idea that certain disruptive societal choices or his-
torical events - the so-called critical junctures hypothesis - may influence subse-
quent economic and institutional development (Collier & Collier 1993, Engerman
& Sokoloff 2002). In the African context, only a recent analysis by Wantchékon &
García-Ponce (2013) has investigated empirically the “critical junctures” hypothesis.
While these authors examine the relationship between independence movements and
post-Cold War democracy, this study focuses on the institutional background of the
fathers of independence and its association with contemporary institutional develop-
ment. Finally, this paper also adds to the debate about leadership quality, political
selection and outcomes as initiated in the citizen-candidate literature (Besley &
Coate 1997). Moreover, I fill the empirical void on the effects of leaders on in-
stitutions by showing that the quality of the first African leaders did matter for
consecutive political development.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2, I discuss some
relevant historical and theoretical background. Section 2.3 elaborates on the data
collection of the pre-colonial ethnic institutional traits of the first leaders used in
this paper, and describes other relevant data sources. Section 2.4 provides details on
47
the empirical exercise and highlights the main findings. Finally, I explore potential
mechanisms in section 2.5 and conclude in section 2.6.
2.2 Historical and Theoretical Background
2.2.1 Pre-Colonial Ethnic Institutions in Africa
Unlike theories suggesting that the economic and political fate of modern Africa
is rooted in its colonial history, other analyses have implied that Africa’s contem-
porary economic and institutional fortune should not be systematically dissociated
with the complexity of its traditional polity (Gennaioli & Rainer 2007, Michalopou-
los & Papaioannou 2013a, Osafo-Kwaako & Robinson 2013). Before colonization,
Africa was inhabited by various cultural and linguistic groups characterized by di-
verse degrees of hierarchical polities.6 At the top of the pyramid, sovereigns such
as the Moro Naba (Mossi Kingdom) and Sonni Ali (Songhai Empire) in Western
Africa, Molambo (Bubi Kingdom) and Ilunga Sungu (Luba Kingdom) in Central
Africa, and Gaki Sherocho (Kaffa Kingdom) in Eastern Africa exerted their au-
thority over highly centralized political entities. At the bottom, the political power
of local headmen from ethnic groups such as the Lobi (Western Africa), the Bari
(Northern Africa), the Kung (Southern Africa) and the Kikuyu (Eastern Africa) was
circumscribed to the village, not beyond. Other ethnicities, structured in the form
of petty or large chiefdoms, lay in the middle of the two aforementioned systems
of jurisdictional hierarchy. These include the Tukulor (Western Africa), the Bwaka
(Central Africa), the Nama (Southern Africa), and the Saadi (Northern Africa).
In addition to this remarkable variety in political centralization, Africa’s eth-
nicities are also quite heterogeneous in other institutional traits such as class strat-
6The information of the jurisdictional hierarchy of ethnic groups in Africa and elsewhere is
collected from the Ethnographic Atlas by ? and later corrected by Gray (1999)
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ification, inheritance distribution rules for real property and the transmission of
political power, among others (Murdock 1959). For example, although they lack
any centralized political structure beyond the village, the Teke from the Repub-
lic of Congo tends to choose their local headmen through elections. Alternatively,
other ethnicities such as the Baule from Côte d’Ivoire and the Angas from Nige-
ria rely respectively on matrilineal and patrilineal systems as succession rules. No
doubt that this significant diversity in the spatial distribution of the institutional
traits of ethnic groups is interesting in and of itself for economic and statistical
analysis (Gennaioli & Rainer 2007, Nunn & Puga 2012), but more than that, these
specific socio-political characteristics have also been present in the political life of
some African countries. For example, the institutional norms of the Zanaki from
Tanzania served as the basis of the Ujamaa, a socio-political and economic program
promoted in the 1960s by Julius Nyerere, the first President of the country (Stoger-
Eising 2000). Since Nyerere was himself from the Zanaki ethnicity, other heads of
states may have also relied on their ancestral institutional background in conducting
public affairs.
A number of studies have investigated the economic and political consequences
of this significant heterogeneity in pre-colonial ethnic institutional arrangements.
Although these studies generally agree on the persistence nature of the ethnic insti-
tutional traits, the results they have often generated are sometimes diverging. For
example, early statehood is thought to fuel economic development (Michalopoulos
& Papaioannou 2013b) while being inversely related to democracy (Hariri 2012).
If political centralization is positively correlated with the provision of public goods
such as education and health (Gennaioli & Rainer 2007) or if it tends to increase
regional prosperity (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou 2013b), therefore, as suggested
by the modernization argument, it should be less likely to engender non-democratic
institutions. In the same vein, Giuliano & Nunn (2013) have also suggested that
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preindustrial democratic societies are the precursors of modern-day democratic na-
tions. However, the data exploited by theses authors, which identified Somalia,
Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia as the African champions of democracy at the local
level, are difficult to reconcile with the contemporary poor institutional performance
of these countries (as measured by the polity score). These irregularities in previous
studies encourage further empirical scrutiny about the importance of pre-colonial
institutional characteristics for contemporary outcomes.
2.2.2 Leadership Quality and Outcomes
The tradition in the literature, when it comes to leadership quality, has been so far
to investigate its economic consequence. For example, the unpredictable death of a
leader (Jones & Olken 2005) or his level of education (Besley & Reynal-Querol 2011)
has been used to predict economic performance. However, as for the institutional
consequence of national leadership, the focus has been essentially on how political
regimes - autocracy or democracy - select politicians, not the other way around.
Here, I fill this void by considering the emergence of new states, about fifty years
ago in Africa, as an opportunity to investigate the link between political development
and the ethnic institutional profile of national leaders.
Whether it is informative about individuals’ competence or honesty, intrinsic or
acquired ethnic characteristics can be decisive in the choice of the median voter. In
particular, I contend that having or lacking inclusive ethnic institutional traits may
affect voters’ perception on the leaders’ morality in conducting public affairs. For
example, because local autocracy is thought to be more pronounced in stratified
societies (Gennaioli & Rainer 2007), as opposed to egalitarian communities, a de-
scendant from a stratified ethnicity could be perceived as more inclined to produce
non-inclusive institutions.
Despite the fact that culturally-induced traits are generally persistent, it has
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been recognized that they can be challenged, if not deteriorated, by incentive-driven
factors such as psychological and material rewards associated with power (Caselli &
Morelli 2004). The distribution of power in Côte d’Ivoire between 1960 and 2000 is
a good illustration of this theory. Under the presidency of Felix Houphouet-Boigny,
a descendant of the inclusive Baule ethnic group, the key ministerial portfolios were
concentrated in the hands of his fellow Akan people.7 For example, under his 33
years of presidency, the ministries of economy, agriculture, and national defense,
among others, have been generally occupied by either a Baule or a member of
the Akan cultural family. Henri Konan Bedie, a Baule native and his successor,
was the first Ivorian (the others being French descendants) to be appointed as the
Minister of Economy in 1966. Since Côte d’Ivoire is the world top producer of co-
coa (40% world production) and has also important oil reserves, the gap between
Houphouet-Boigny’s political agenda and its ethnic values could have been moti-
vated by rent-seeking behavior. Far from being an exception, the case of Boigny
seems to reflect a widespread experience across Africa. Indeed, this paper provides
evidence that potential access to natural resource is one reason why descendants of
inclusive ethnicities failed to generate democratic institutions in Africa.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Leaders and their Ethnic Affiliation
To determine the identity and the ethnic affiliation of the founding fathers of post-
colonial Africa, I employ a couple of approaches. First, I exploit the Archigos
dataset, compiled by Goemans et al. (2006), to obtain information on the identity
of 51 African heads of states at independence. Second, using a variety of sources,
7The Akan is a cultural group which comprises sub-ethnic groups such as the Baule, Asante,
Anyi, Nzema and others who essentially live in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana.
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the then identified heads of states are matched to their respective ethnic groups.8 It
is worth mentioning that this data collection initiative, which has been voluntarily
restricted to the ethnic identity of the first leaders of the sovereign African nations,
is autonomous from similar enterprises undertaken by authors such as Kasara (2007)
and, Franck & Rainer (2012). Columns 1-5 of Table 2.1 provide more details on
the leaders’ identity, their birthplace, their country of origin and their respective
ethnicity.9
It is important to distinguish the purpose of this investigation from previous
works that have used similar dataset on the ethnic identity of African leaders. Au-
thors such as Londregan, Bienen & Van de Walle (1995), Kasara (2007) and, Franck
& Rainer (2012), among others, have used similar information of leaders’ ethnic iden-
tities to investigate chauvinism and political transition in Africa. This line of inquiry
is beyond the scope of this paper, which is more concerned about the transmission
of ethnic institutional capital to modern polity via national leaders.
2.3.2 Pre-Colonial Institutional Heritage
One objective of this paper is to use the collected information on the ethnic iden-
tity of the earliest national leaders in Africa to uncover their ethnic institutional
heritage. For this, I use primarily the Ethnographic Atlas database, constructed
by Murdock (1967), which provides detailed information on the preindustrial char-
acteristics of more than 1200 societies around the globe. For Africa, the atlas
contains information on 834 ethnic groups, identifies their location and describes
their main cultural, political and economic features. I complement Murdock’s atlas
with alternative sources such as Nicholls (1913), Wilson (1971), and Stoger-Eising
8A leader’s ethnicity is defined as the ethnicity of his parents. In the case where his parents are
from difference ethnicities, I consider first the ethnicity of the father, the ethnicity of the mother
being the other alternative.
9South Sudan, which gained independence in July 2011, is not dissociated from Sudan in this
study.
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Table 2.1: Ethnicities and Inherited Ethnic Institutional Capital of Leaders
Country Leader Birthplace Ethnicity Equality Inclusiveness Democracy Heritage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Algeria Bella Maghnia Algerians Yes No No Yes
Angola Neto Bengo Kimbundu No No No No
Benin Maga Parakou Bariba No No No No
Botswana Khama Serowe Tswana No No No No
B. Faso Yameogo Koudougou Mossi No No No No
Burundi Micombero Rutovu Rundi No No No No
Cameroon Ahidjo Garoua Adamawa No Yes - Yes
Cape Verde Pires+ Fogo - - - -
CA Republic Dacko Bouchia Bwaka Yes Yes No Yes
Chad Tombalbaye Koumra Sala/Sara - Yes - Yes
Comoros Abdallah Domoni Comorians - - - -
Congo Youlou Madibou Teke No - Yes Yes
Côte d’Ivoire Boigny+ Yamoussoukro Baule No Yes No Yes
DR Congo Kasavubu Tshela Kongo No No No No
Djibouti Aptidon+ Lughaya Esa Yes No No Yes
Egypt Nasser Bakos Egyptians Yes No Yes Yes
Eq.Guinea Nguema Nsegayong Ngumba Yes Yes No Yes
Eritrea Afeworki+ Asmara Tigrinya Yes No No Yes
Ethiopia Menelek II Shewa Amhara Yes - - Yes
Gabon Mba Libreville Fang No No No No
Gambia Jawara+ Barajally Malinke No No No No
Ghana Nkrumah Nkroful Nzema No No No No
Guinea Toure Faranah Malinke No No No No
G.-Bissau Cabral Bissau Pepel No Yes - Yes
Kenya Kenyatta Gatundu Kikuyu No No No No
Lesotho Jonathan Leribe Sotho No No No No
Liberia Tubman Harper Americo - - - -
Liberian
Libya Idris Al-Jaghbub Sanusi Yes - - Yes
Madagascar Tsiranana Ambarikorano Tsimihety* - Yes - Yes
Malawi Banda+ Kasungu Chewa - Yes No Yes
Mali Keita Bamako Bambara No No No No
Mauritania Daddah Boutilimit Trarza Yes No - Yes
Mauritius Ramgoolam Belle Rive - - - -
Morocco Mohammed V Fes Moroccans Yes No - Yes
Mozambique Machel Madragoa Thonga No No No No
Namibia Nujoma+ Ongandjera Ambo No No No No
Niger Diori Soudoure Zerma Yes - Yes Yes
Nigeria Azikiwe Zungeru Igbo Yes Yes No Yes
Rwanda Kayibanda Tare Ruanda Yes No No Yes
Senegal Senghor Joal Serer No No No No
Sierra Leone Margai Gbangbatoke Mende Yes No No Yes
Somalia Daar Beledweyne Hawiya Yes No Yes Yes
South Africa Botha Greytown Boers No No No No
Sudan Abboud Suakin Shaigiya* Yes - - Yes
Swaziland Subhuza II Zombodze Swazi No No No No
Tanzania Nyerere Butiama Zanaki* - Yes Yes Yes
Togo Olympio Lome Ewe No No Yes Yes
Tunisia Bourguiba Monastir Tunisians - No - No
Uganda Obote Akokoro Lango No No No No
Zambia Kaunda+ Chinsali Bemba No No No No
Zimbabwe Mugabe+ Harare Zezuru No - No No
Notes: * Anthropological information on these ethnicities is from secondary sources other than
the primary source based on Murdock (1967). These sources include Wilson (1967) for the Tmisi-
hety, Stoger-Eising (2000) for the Zanaki and Nicholls (1913) for the Shaigiya.
+ These national leaders were still in power after the end of the Cold-War.
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(2000) to identify the institutional characteristics of the ethnicities not recorded in
the primary data source. Of the 48 heads of states, for which the ethnic affiliation
is acknowledged in my database, I have been able to systematically match 47 lead-
ers to the institutional traits of their ethnicities.10 Since, Tubman Harper the first
president of Liberia and an Americo-Liberian descendant is from an ethnicity that
is not institutionally categorized, I coded its institutional characteristics as missing
and dropped it from the analysis. Columns 6-8 of Table 2.1 report the institutional
characteristics that local communities may have transmitted to their descendants
who would later become the founding fathers of modern Africa.
Having identified the leaders, their ethnicity, and the institutional background
of their ancestors, I construct the variable of interest, labeled as “Heritage”, us-
ing three pre-colonial institutional features. The first variable, identified as “Class
Stratification” ranges from 1 to 5, and describes the extent of class differentiation
within the ethnic group. I assign a score of 1 if there is an “absence of significant
class distinctions among freemen” in an ethnic society and 0 otherwise. The second
variable, “Succession to the Office of Local Headman”, provides information about
the appointment process of the local headman. As in Giuliano & Nunn (2013), an
ethnic group has a democratic experience and given a score of 1 if the mode of
succession of its local headman is through elections or consensus, and 0 otherwise.
The third and last variable captures the “Inheritance Distribution for Real Property
(Land)”. I assign a score of 1 to an ethnic group that falls into the category “equal
or relatively equal”, and 0 otherwise.
Why are the leaders with the aforementioned ethnic institutional heritage defined
as “good” leaders in this study? Simply because these variables are either direct
measures of democracy - in the case of the succession by elections or consensus -
10Since the islands of Cape Verde, Comoros and Mauritius appear in the Ethnographic Atlas
as uninhabited, the ethnic identities of their respective first leaders, Pedro Pires, Ahmed Abdallah
and Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, are coded as unknown.
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or correlates of political participation - in the case of the absence of stratification
or the equal distribution of inheritance. For example, Ember et al. (1997) use
anthropological data and show that absence of class stratification, a measure of
equality, is positively correlated with political participation across cultures. As
for the equal distribution of inheritance among the heirs, De Toqueville (1829) in
his assessment of democracy in Western societies has also praised the “virtue of
the law of partible inheritance” as an important foundation of the Anglo-American
political inclusion. Finally, a recent paper by Giuliano & Nunn (2013) has also
shown that some states are democratic today because their ancestors embraced
democracy before the industrial Revolution. In the context of this study, I assume
that the African leaders with one of these ethnic institutional qualities are the ones
that took office at independence with a democratic heritage.
Figures 2.1 - 2.4 show the spatial distribution of the three pre-colonial institu-
tional characteristics that are the focus of this analysis: class stratification; succes-
sion of the local headman; and inheritance distribution for real property. The blue
and green polygons on these maps indicate the variables that have been coded as
1, while the other colored polygons show the variables coded as 0. Finally, poly-
gons showing missing information and uninhabited areas are left blank. As shown
in these maps, there is a substantial degree of variation in the ethnic institutional
traits within and across the African countries. It also appears that some of these
institutional characteristics may overlap. For example, while the Bwaka (Central
African Republic) and the Ngumba (Equatorial Guinea) are both characterized by
egalitarian property rights and societal inclusiveness practices, the Egyptian Arabs
(Egypt) and the Zerma (Niger) seem to have been characterized by both egalitarian
property rights and democratic norms. Other societies such as the Teke (Congo),
the Baule (Côte d’Ivoire) and the Ewe (Togo) could only claim one dimension of
the ethnic institutional capital as defined above, namely societal inclusiveness.
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To construct the country-level independent variable of interest in this study, the
starting point is the ethnic identity of each country’s first leader at independence.
If the first head of state is a descendant of an ethnic group whose institutional traits
fall in one of the three categories of the ethnic institutional capital previously defined
- i.e. societal inclusiveness, democratic norms, and egalitarian property rights - then
his country is assigned a score of 1 for that variable. The countries whose leaders
do not satisfy this requirement are given the score of 0.11
11Under this criterion, 25 out of 47 countries are identified as having a leader from a democratic
background. However, when I impose that the first leader be a descendant of an ethnic group whose





Figure 1: Spatial Distribution of Social Stratification in Ethnic Territories 















Figure 2: Succession to the Office of the Local Headman 
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Figure 3: Inheritance Distribution for Real Property (Land) 
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Figure 4: Countries with Leaders Having (Blue) and Not Having (Green) an Ethnic Institutional Heritage. 





















































Figure 2.4: First Leaders and Democratic Heritage
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In figure 2.4, the countries whose leaders could claim an ethnic institutional
capital heritage are shown in blue, and the countries whose leaders do not have
such an institutional background are shown in green. As previously mentioned,
countries for which there is no information on the ethnic institutional background
of the first leaders are displayed in white (See Liberia for example).
Among the 47 countries, for which information on the institutional background
of the first leaders are available, 25 countries were run at independence by leaders
coming from institutionally inclusive - from the perspective of this study - local
communities. Most of the countries identified in Giuliano & Nunn (2013) as having
a tradition of local democracy in Africa, namely Somalia, Morocco and Egypt are in
this sample. It also includes Sub-Saharan African countries such as Côte d’Ivoire,
Niger, Rwanda and Malawi, among others. For the 22 remaining countries, the map
shows that they are also spatially spread all over the African continent. Among
them, there are Southern African countries such as South Africa and Namibia, as
well as Western African countries such as Mali and Senegal, and Tunisia a Northern
African state.
2.3.3 Measuring Democracy
To measure the contemporaneous level of political development in Africa, I use the
most recent version of the Polity2 score, developed in the Polity IV project by Mar-
shall & Jaggers (2012). This is a broad measure of democracy, which classifies
countries from the most exclusive political regime (-10) to the most inclusive po-
litical system (+10). Specifically, the country-level Polity2 score is obtained from
subtracting each country’s Autocracy score from its Democracy score. Since both
the Autocracy and Democracy variables reflect, by construction, the extent to which
political participation is fair and open as well as the constraints on the chief execu-
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Figure 2.5: Annual Changes in Average Level of Democracy using Polity2 Score
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As shown in figure 2.5, post-independence political experience in Africa under
the two types of leadership defined above is characterized by two waves. During
the first wave, which lasts from 1960 to 1990 and overlaps with the Cold War
era, there was less variation in democratic experience.12 Nonetheless, countries for
which the variable heritage is coded as 1 performed better politically than their
counterparts during this time period. As for the second wave, which starts at the
end of the Cold War in 1990, there is a significant variation in democratic scores
with a notable comparative advantage in favor of countries whose leaders lack the
ethnic institutional capital as previously defined. These countries’ mean normalized
- on a 0-1 scale - post-Cold War democratic score is about 0.571 when the others
have 0.416 (Table 2.2).
Motivated by this significant variation in Africa’s institutional trend after 1990,
and following authors such as Wantchékon & García-Ponce (2013) and Hariri (2012),
the primary empirical specifications in this study (OLS and IV estimations) use
the post-Cold War average level of democracy as the main dependent variable.
The average normalized level of democracy at that time varies from the minimum
score of 0.045 to the maximum score of 1.13 Since a score of 1 indicates the most
inclusive political regime (equivalent to +10 in the original coding system), states
like Botswana (0.886), South Africa (0.932), Cape Verde (0.954) and Mauritius
(1) seem to be the most democratic African regimes. At the bottom of the list,
Swaziland (0.045), Eritrea (0.170), Libya (0.182) and Morocco (0.191) are the least
democratic states.
It is worth mentioning that in addition to the OLS and IV specifications, I also
use, for extensions, alternative empirical strategies that are not restricted to the
12This result is consistent with similar observation in Wantchékon & García-Ponce (2013) in
which countries with insurrectional legacy and civil disobedience legacy present similar trends
during the Cold War period.
13The statistics on the minimum and maximum values are not shown in the summary statistics
Table 2.2, but they are available upon request.
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post-Cold War polity scores. In particular, in the Difference-In-Differences and the
Fixed Effects estimations, I consider annual democratic scores for both the pre-Cold
War and the post-Cold War era to analyze the link between ethnic institutional cap-
ital of the first leaders and the trajectory of contemporaneous political development
in Africa.
2.3.4 Neolithic Revolution and Other Historical Events
Is the intrinsic quality of a politician stemming from his ethnic heritage, whether
it signals his competence or his degree of honesty, important for political compe-
tition? If one answers this question by the affirmative, then linking institutional
heritage to political outcome may entail some endogeneity problems. Simply put,
some African leaders who competed for power right after colonization may have
been selected by their constituencies or the former colonial powers because their
ancestral heritage was a significant asset. To overcome this issue, I must identify
a source of exogenous variation in the institutional characteristics of national lead-
ers. Before that, it is important to recall that a critical assumption of this paper
is that leaders’ institutional quality was inherited from their ancestors. Thus, a
possible source of exogenous variation in the pre-colonial institutional features of
ethnic nations can eventually be used as an instrument for the institutional quality
of the first leaders. Because it ascertains the transition from the nomadic lifestyle
to sedentariness, which is the starting point of initial codification of societal norms,
I use the timing since the Neolithic Revolution as instrument for the pre-industrial
institutional traits that the ethnic groups transmitted to the national leaders. Of
course, this instrumental variable may not be perfect for two main reasons. First,
it is by construction a country-level proxy for the transition from hunting and gath-
ering to agriculture and settlement, not an ethnic-specific proxy, which would have
been ideal for this paper. Second, its accuracy could be undermined by potential
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migration patterns across the continent, something Putterman & Trainor (2006),
who collected the data, have claimed that they took into account. Nonetheless, as
shown in Table 2.2, countries in which the leaders inherited some ethnic institu-
tional capital seem to have experienced their agricultural Revolution almost 1000
years before their counterparts.
Other historical variables may have been important for contemporaneous level
of democracy. As a precaution against the likelihood that factors such as colonial
origins, ethnic or religious fragmentations and the duration of civil conflict drive
the link between ethnic heritage and democracy, I include them as control variables.
The colonial origin control is a dummy variable indicating whether the country is a
former British, French or Portuguese colony, which aims at capturing the difference
in democratic experiences among countries distinguished along their former colonial
powers. The data on ethnic and religious fragmentation, and years of civil conflict
are collected from Fearon & Laitin (2003) and the Correlates of War project compiled
by Sarkees & Schafer (2000), respectively.
2.3.5 Economic and Geographic Factors
Motivated by the empirical regularities between economic development and democ-
racy, I control for development statistics using data provided by the World Bank
such as GDP per capita, population size, and the share of population living in ur-
ban areas. More specifically, while the data on GDP per capita and population size
cover the period 1960-2010, information on the share of the urban population I use is
restricted to the period 1950-1955 and it aims at giving the extent of urban lifestyle
at independence. By including the latter, I want to ascertain, as in Wantchékon
& García-Ponce (2013), that the result is not influenced by the degree of earlier
“modernization.” In order to take into account the resource curse hypothesis and its
implications for institutional development, I also include a variable that captures for
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
Full Heritage=0 Heritage=1
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Pre-Colonial Institutional Traits and Neolithic Revolution
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Property Rights 0.38 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.76 0.44
Societal Inclusiveness 0.25 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.51
Democratic Norms 0.17 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.51
Heritage 0.53 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Neolithic Revolution (x1000) 2.89 1.27 2.53 0.24 3.47 1.20
Panel B. Democracy, Relevant Controls, and Potential Mechanisms
Polity2 (Post-Cold War) 0.52 0.23 0.57 0.24 0.42 0.18
GDP per Capita (Logarithm) 6.61 1.10 6.67 1.14 6.51 1.05
Population (Logarithm) 15.82 1.38 15.91 1.19 16.06 1.37
Urban Population Growth (% of Total Population) 5.56 1.77 5.45 2.11 5.73 1.49
Natural Resource Dependence 1.86 1.18 1.73 1.20 2.04 1.21
Ethnic Fragmentation 0.64 0.24 0.62 0.26 0.69 0.20
Religious Fragmentation 0.47 0.24 0.55 0.25 0.43 0.29
Years of Civil Conflict 6.78 9.78 6.82 9.77 7.48 10.47
French Ex-Colony 0.41 0.50 0.32 0.48 0.48 0.51
British Ex-Colony 0.37 0.49 0.46 0.51 0.32 0.48
Ruggedness 0.99 1.14 1.01 1.35 0.87 0.88
Latitude 13.50 9.67 14.24 10.09 12.94 9.97
European Language 0.04 0.13 0.02 0.03 0.002 0.01
Executive Constraints in 1970 3.02 1.72 2.95 1.91 1.96 1.06
Crude Oil Proved Reserves (Billion Barrels) 1.47 5.10 0.31 0.91 2.73 7.09
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each country its degree of natural resource dependence. Using the World Bank WDI
data on mineral fuel, ores and metal exports as a share of merchandise exports and
following Jensen & Wantchékon (2004), I attribute to each country a score ranging
from 1 to 4 according to its degree of resource dependence. In particular, a country
receives a score of 1, 2, 3 and 4 if the share of natural resources in merchandise ex-
ports was less than 25%, between 25% and 50%, between 50% and 75%, and greater
than 75%, respectively over the period 1980-2010.
I also include geographic factors such the absolute value of latitude and mea-
sure of terrain ruggedness index. Following Jared (1997), it is possible that coun-
tries situated along similar latitudes, because they shared similar climates, were
more likely to be exposed to the propagation of institutional capital and technol-
ogy. As for terrain ruggedness, it could incentivize reliance on guerilla warfare as
a method of political dissent and ultimately affect institutional outcomes such as
democracy (Wantchékon & García-Ponce 2013). The data on the index of terrain
ruggedness comes from Nunn & Puga (2012).
2.4 The Empirics of Leaders’ Institutional Heritage
and Democracy
As already discussed in section 2.3.3, democratic experience in post-independence
Africa is marked by a significant variation in the post-Cold War era (Figure 2.5). As
a consequence, the left-hand side variable in the primary econometric specifications
of this study (OLS and 2SLS) is the average level of post-Cold War democracy, cov-
ering the period 1991-2010. This raises the question of whether or not it is pertinent
to use the ethnic institutional profile of the first leader to predict long-term political
changes.14 As relevant as this question is, its resolution necessitates a rigorous sta-
14In the database on national leadership in Table 2.1, approximately 18% (9 out of 51) of the
African first heads of states stayed in power after the end of the Cold War. These heads of states
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tistical investigation as I intend to do here using the critical junctures hypothesis.
A key insight of this institutional path dependence theory is that contemporary
institutional development may well be explained by certain critical historical moves
or choices (Collier & Collier 1993). This idea is well summarized by Bratton, Van de
Walle & Lange (1997) when they write that “a contingent model of change assumes
that one agent’s initiative prompts another actor’s response and that political events
cascade iteratively from one to another.”
In what follows, I use a couple of conventional econometric frameworks to for-
mally investigate the link between African leaders’ ethnic institutional traits at
independence and contemporary political development.
2.4.1 Ordinary Least Squares
In Table 2.3, I summarize the results based on the following ordinary least squares
regression that associates the post-Cold War average level of democracy with the
African leaders’ ethnic institutional profile at independence:
Democracyi = α + βHeritagei +X
′
iΓ + εi, (2.1)
where Democracyi is the average level of democracy over the period 1991-2010
in state i, as measured by the Polity2 index; Heritagei is a binary variable that
equals 1 if the first leader of state i is a descendant of an ethnic group with at
least one of the following institutional characteristics: absence of class stratification
among freemen; equal or relatively equal distribution of inheritance for real property;
and/or using elections or other forms of consensus in the succession of the local
headman. Otherwise, it takes the value 0. In addition to these two variables, I also
include Xi, which is a set of country-specific control variables including geographic,
are indicated with the symbol (+) in Table 2.1.
68
historical, and economic factors. For the economic variables, I use the post-Cold
War average of GDP per capita, population size (both in logarithm terms), the share
of population living in urban areas between 1955 and 1960 as well as the natural
resource dependence measure. While the coefficient β, the parameter of interest,
captures the effects of the first leaders’ ethnic institutional quality on contemporary
democracy, the terms α and εi are the constant and the stochastic error, respectively.
To assess the importance of the first leader’s quality on democracy, I start by
evaluating a univariate regression in which average post-Cold War democracy is
regressed on the variable Heritage (Column 1). If Heritage captures democratic
norms, either directly (succession by consensus) or indirectly (no stratification and
partible inheritance rules being positively correlated to political participation), one
might intuitively expect a positive coefficient β, suggesting that leaders with the
aforementioned ethnic institutional backgrounds should be more likely to transmit
democracy as a political legacy. On the contrary, the results displayed in column 1
indicate a negative (-0.154) and statistically significant coefficient at the 5% level on
Heritage, implying that leaders with good ethnic institutional capitals produce less
democracy relatively to their counterparts without a similar heritage. Although this
less intuitive result requires additional empirical investigations, it is still consistent
with the summary statistics compiled in Table 2.2, in which it appears that the
political legacy of the institutionally well-endowed leaders is less inclusive than the
legacy of their counterparts.
In subsequent columns (columns 2-6), I progressively add the relevant subcate-
gories of controls (columns 2-5) including successively the economic controls (column
2), the geographic controls (column 3), the historical controls (column 4), and both
economic and geographic controls (column 5), before I consider all the controls vari-
ables in column 6. The economic controls are: the average level of GDP per capita
(logarithm) and population size (logarithm) between 1991 and 2010; the share of
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Table 2.3: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
Dependent Variable is Post-Cold War Average Level of Democracy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Heritage -0.154** -0.150** -0.158** -0.140** -0.152** -0.129**
(0.061) (0.062) (0.061) (0.057) (0.063) (0.055)
GDP per Capita -0.027 -0.028 -0.032
(0.035) (0.038) (0.031)
Population 0.011 0.010 0.009
(0.026) (0.030) (0.028)
Urban Growth -0.020 -0.017 -0.022
(0.023) (0.021) (0.019)
Resource Dependence -0.021 -0.025 -0.019
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023)
Latitude -0.001 0.000 0.008**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Ruggedness -0.015 -0.016 -0.005
(0.038) (0.043) (0.039)
French Ex-Colony -0.037 -0.052
(0.073) (0.072)
British Ex-Colony -0.020 -0.074
(0.066) (0.070)
Ethnic Fragmentation 0.220 0.266
(0.166) (0.178)
Religious Fragmentation 0.197 0.340**
(0.125) (0.144)
Years of Conflict -0.005** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.571*** 0.724 0.603*** 0.384*** 0.751 0.445
(0.050) (0.553) (0.058) (0.109) (0.635) (0.576)
Observations 47 46 47 47 46 46
R2 0.128 0.206 0.139 0.302 0.211 0.454
Robust Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
70
urban population at the eve of the 1960s; and the natural resource dependence vari-
able. Including this first subcategory of control variables in column 2 does not alter
the qualitative result of the univariate case; the coefficient of Heritage is still nega-
tive and statistically significant at the 5% level, and neither GDP per capita nor the
two population variables seem to have been statistically important for contemporary
democratic performance.
In columns 3-5, I first add to the baseline specification the geographic (column
3) and historical controls (column 4) separately, before considering together both
the economic and geographic covariates in column 5. Once again the negative cor-
relation between the first leader’s ethnic institutional heritage and post-Cold War
democracy is robust across these alternative specifications. More specifically, the
geographic factors including the absolute latitude and the terrain ruggedness in-
dex have no significant statistical effects on contemporary democracy whether they
are included solely (column 3) or with the economic controls (column 5) in the re-
duced form equation 2.1. As for the historical controls in column 4, while former
colonies dummies and both ethnic and religious fragmentation seem not to matter
for democracy in this framework, the extent of civil wars is negatively associated
with post-Cold War political participation at the 5% level of statistical significance.
Although there is less intellectual consensus on the detrimental effects of war in gen-
eral and civil war in particular on institutional building (Blattman & Miguel 2010),
this finding suggests that the extent of civil conflict may have weakened democratic
institutions in Africa after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet
Union.
Column 6 includes all the covariates from the subset of controls previously pre-
sented. Interestingly, the coefficient of the absolute value of latitude enters the
system with a positive and statistically significant sign at the 5% level. This pro-
vides support to the argument of Jared (1997) that technology and institutions were
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easily spread along the East-West axis than along the North-South axis.15 In ad-
dition to the importance of this geographic factor, two historical variables, namely
religious fragmentation and the duration of civil conflict, appear in the specification
with the expected signs. I find a strong and positive correlation between religious
diversity and political inclusion, as measured by the polity score. Also, as before,
the duration of civil war appears to hinder democracy. Regarding the coefficient of
Heritage, it is still negative and statistically significant at the 5% level confirming
that the result of the univariate case in column 1 is robust to controlling relevant
geographic, historical and economic factors. In sum, African leaders who inherited
egalitarian and democratic norms from their ancestors, as opposed to the ones with-
out such an institutional quality, have been on average less successful in conveying
inclusive institutions as political legacy. On average, the post-Cold War democracy
score in the countries of the “good” leaders is about 0.15 lower - on a 0-1 scale -
than the level of democracy in the countries of their counterparts.
2.4.2 Two-Stage Least Squares
In the previous section, both the univariate and the multivariate OLS estimations of
the reduced-form specifications, linking first leaders’ ethnic institutional quality to
democracy, have shown a reversal of fortune in the transmission of democratic norms
in Africa. Before I investigate the underlying mechanisms at play, it is important to
address potential concerns that may affect the reliability of the OLS results. Perhaps
the quality of the first leaders at the birth of new African states was an important
aspect of their accession to political power. It is possible, for instance, that the
initial political and institutional traits of some ethnic groups may predispose their
descendants to be more or less competitive in the race for power and its exercise.
15The positive correlation between latitude and democratic outcome, as measured by the polity
score, means that African countries at high attitude tend be relatively more democratic than
tropical countries.
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Or, it may be the case that the leaders who ended up being heads of states at
independence were chosen by the former colonial powers because of their initial
political or institutional heritage. If the advent of the first leaders in power happened
under any of these circumstances or similar conditions, then the results presented
so far will suffer from an endogeneity bias.
To deal with this potential endogeneity problem, I use an instrumental variables
approach. As in Hariri (2012), I employ the time that has elapsed between the
Neolithic Revolution and each country’s independence date as an instrument for
the pre-colonial ethnic institutional features of its dwellers. Because the Neolithic
Revolution ascertains the transition from nomadic lifestyle to sedentariness, it may
be relevant in explaining initial codifications of societal norms, thus being a correlate
of the institutional features of the countries’ ethnicities.
Using the premises that earlier institutional arrangements depend on the timing
of the Neolithic Revolution, and that having or not a particular institutional profile
is an indirect consequence of the Neolithic Revolution, I estimate the following linear
probability equation:
Heritagei = κ+ σNeolithici +X
′
i∆ + µi, (2.2)
where Neolithici is the time that has run out between the Neolithic transition
and the accession of state i to independence. Heritagei is a dummy variable that
indicates, as before, whether or not the leader of the state i is a descendant of an
ethnic group having egalitarian and democratic pre-colonial institutional norms. Xi
is a set of controls identical to the ones defined in the OLS case. κ, µi and σ are
the constant, the error term, and the coefficient of correlation between the variables
Neolithici and Heritagei, respectively.
In the 2SLS terminology, equation 2.2 being the first-stage, the second stage is
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Table 2.4: Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates
Second Stage: Dependent Variable is Post-Cold War Average Level of Democracy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Heritage -0.453*** -0.536** -0.481*** -0.341** -0.601** -0.305**
(0.175) (0.222) (0.168) (0.172) (0.256) (0.122)
GDP per Capita -0.053 -0.071 -0.075**
(0.043) (0.062) (0.035)
Population 0.028 0.027 0.017
(0.044) (0.048) (0.027)
Urban Growth -0.013 -0.004 -0.022
(0.027) (0.028) (0.018)
Resource Dependence 0.010 0.010 0.004
(0.040) (0.045) (0.024)
Latitude -0.002 0.003 0.012***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Ruggedness -0.027 -0.037 -0.000
(0.034) (0.036) (0.031)
French Ex-Colony -0.026 -0.015
(0.088) (0.075)
British Ex-Colony -0.015 -0.043
(0.075) (0.078)
Ethnic Fragmentation 0.311* 0.356**
(0.181) (0.166)
Religious Fragmentation 0.101 0.368**
(0.156) (0.156)
Years of Conflict -0.005 -0.008***
(0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.729*** 0.709 0.793*** 0.467*** 0.823 0.486
(0.108) (0.822) (0.108) (0.138) (0.963) (0.535)
Observations 44 43 44 44 43 43
R2 . . . 0.050 . 0.346
First Stage: Dependent Variable is Heritage Dummy
Neolithic 0.169*** 0.151*** 0.177*** 0.166*** 0.147** 0.196***
(0.040) (0.047) (0.041) (0.048) (0.054) (0.069)
Economic Controls No Yes No No Yes Yes
Geographic Controls No No Yes No Yes Yes
Historical Controls No No No Yes No Yes
Observations 44 43 44 44 43 43
R2 0.159 0.208 0.168 0.219 0.209 0.275
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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the equation 2.1. Using the 2SLS procedure, I estimate both equations and compile
the regression results in Table 2.4. This technique implies that the effect of Heritage
on contemporary democratic performance is causal if the exclusion restriction that
the variable Neolithic is absent from equation 2.1 is valid. In other words, if the
timing between the Neolithic transition and independence matters for post-Cold
War democracy, it is probably because its correlation with the ethnic institutional
quality of the first leaders.
As shown in Panel 2 of Table 2.4, there is a strong and positive correlation
between the Heritage dummy and the Neolithic variable. As for the coefficient of
the variable of interest, the Heritage dummy, its estimates via 2SLS with the subsets
of controls are presented in columns 1-6 of Panel 1 in Table 2.4. Once again, I find
a strong and negative correlation between the Heritage dummy and post-Cold War
democracy levels. On average, the institutional legacy of “good” leaders has been
about 0.45 lower, in terms of the polity score, than the institutional legacy of the
leaders with the alternative ethnic institutional quality. The estimated coefficient
is higher than the OLS estimates (Table 2.3) and it is highly statistically significant
with an average standard deviation of about 0.18.
2.4.3 Extensions: Difference-in-Differences and Fixed Effects
It could be the case that unobserved or hard-to-account-for country-specific (or
ethnic-specific) characteristics are driving the statistical link between leaders’ eth-
nic institutional quality and post-Cold War political trajectory in Africa. Ideally, a
time-series cross-sectional data on the ethnic institutional background of the African
leaders would be preferred to deal with these potential issues, but the binary na-
ture of the Heritage is an obstacle for such an econometric analysis. Nonetheless,
following Wantchékon & García-Ponce (2013), I can exploit the structural break
in the African states’ polity score in 1990, as shown in figure 2.5, to extend the
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econometric analysis beyond the cross-sectional frameworks used so far.
Political scientists such as Villalón & Huxtable (1998) have often interpreted
this discontinuity in African polities following the fall of the Berlin Wall as one of
the most critical steps in the emergence of different political paths. In the same
vein, Wantchékon & García-Ponce (2013) have also suggested that the end of the
Cold War could also be seen as the end of direct international interferences in African
national polities. If these theories are accurate, then the impact of the leaders’
ethnic institutional quality on democracy in their respective countries should be
more important after than before 1990.
As in Wantchékon & García-Ponce (2013), I confront this hypothesis to an em-
pirical scrutiny using the difference-in-differences method. In doing so, I compare
democracy levels between pre and post stage of the Cold War in the two categories
of countries: the ones where the first leaders inherited the egalitarian and demo-
cratic norms and the ones where the first leaders did not have such a heritage. In
particular, the following equation is estimated:
Democracyit = αi + (Heritagei · post1990t)′ϕ+ post1990′tϑ+ εit, (2.3)
where Democracyit is the average level of democracy at time t, t being the period
before or after the Cold War; αii is the country fixed-effects which captures time-
invariant country characteristics; post1990t is a dummy variable that equals to 1
for the post-Cold War era, and 0 otherwise; Heritagei · post1990t is an interaction
between the Heritagei dummy and the post1990t dummy; and εit is the error term.
While the coefficient ϑ captures the overall difference in democracy levels between
the Cold War era and the post-Cold War era, the coefficient ϕ should inform the
reader on the difference in the post-Cold War levels of democracy between the two
types of countries.
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The same hypothesis can also be tested using the fixed-effects approach. For
this, I estimate the following equation:
Democracyit = αi + πt + (Heritagei · post1990t)′θ + post1990′tφ+ vit, (2.4)
where Democracyit is defined as before with the exception that t is now every year
since independence before and after the end of the Cold War; αi, πt and Xit are
the country and year fixed effects, and a set of time-varying controls such as GDP
per capita and population size, respectively. The coefficient θ aims at capturing
the difference in democracy levels after the Cold War between the two categories of
countries.
The results of both the DID and the FE estimations, displayed in Table 2.5, are
consistent with the previous findings obtained from both the OLS and IV estima-
tions. The political legacy of the leaders whose ancestors had inclusive and demo-
cratic pre-colonial institutions has been less democratic than the political legacy of
their counterparts. This result is not only robust to several control variables such as
economic, historical and geographic covariates, but it is also strong when alternative
econometric methods to the standard OLS procedure are used, including the DID
and FE techniques. Moreover, the statistical links between the ethnic institutional
quality of the first African leaders and contemporary democracy levels seem to be
a causal relationship, as suggested by the results of the 2SLS methodology.
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Table 2.5: Difference-in-Differences and Fixed-Effects Estimates
Dependent Variable is Average Level of Democracy since Independence
DD FE FE Robust SE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Heritage x Post Cold War -0.154** -0.039** -0.036** -0.039** -0.036**
(0.061) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Post Cold War Dummy 0.324***
(0.058)




Constant 0.247*** 0.353*** 0.144 0.353*** -1.093***
(0.030) (0.112) (0.127) (0.092) (0.193)
Observations 93 2352 2299 2352 2299
R2 0.303 0.358 0.361 0.583 0.589
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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2.5 Uncovering Potential Mechanisms
Did the ethnic institutional characteristics of the first African leaders at indepen-
dence play a crucial role in subsequent political development? The sequence of
statistical methods I have used so far to investigate this important issue suggests
that I answer this question in the affirmative. Surprisingly, leaders whose ethnici-
ties are identified in anthropological records as having democracy-enhancing features
seem to have been the ones who transmitted non-democratic institutions as political
legacy. The question now is why did the “good” leaders produce “bad” institutions?
In what follows, I explore a series of theories about social norms, whether they are
attitudinal (what people from a particular kinship are supposed to do) or behavioral
(what they actually do), that may be relevant in explaining this institutional turn-
about. Specifically, using the World Values Survey database, I start by examining
whether or not individuals belonging to the ethnicities I have identified as having
inclusive ancestral backgrounds tend to be more or less supportive of contemporary
democratic institutions. Next, I also investigate alternative explanations including
political and materialistic motivations that may have incentivized African national
leaders to opt for a political choice that is at the odds of their social virtues.
2.5.1 Attitudes Towards Democracy
One of the underlying hypotheses of this paper is the idea documented by Giuliano &
Nunn (2013) that suggests an intergenerational transmission of democracy. These
authors have empirically demonstrated that the transmission of democracy from
pre-industrial local communities to modern states may have been partly possible
because of the positive impact of the earlier democratic experiences on citizens’
attitudes towards contemporary democratic institutions. In the context of this
paper, it is unclear whether the non-transmission of local democracy is explained by
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the national leadership effects solely or a shift in the perception about democracy of
the descendants of the politically inclusive ethnicities. Using both the World Values
Survey (WVS hereafter) database and the information collected by Fearon (2003)
on the share of ethnic groups in each country, I test the latter hypothesis by looking
at people’s perception and beliefs about democratic institutions in their respective
countries of residence. From the integrated WVS database, which contains five
waves, I use the information on the 14 African countries in which the survey has
been conducted at least once.16
Following Giuliano & Nunn (2013), I estimate the following individual-level re-
gression using the OLS technique:
Yict = αt + πt + βDemoHeritagec +X
′
ictγ + εict, (2.5)
where Yict represent successively one of the three outcomes variables capturing indi-
vidual i’s perception about democracy in his country of residence c during the wave
t of the World Values Survey. The first outcome, labeled in the WVS as E117, is
an ordinal and discrete variable varying from 1 to 4 that summarizes respondents’
self-reported assessment about the importance of diverse political systems. Regard-
ing democracy, the possible answers and their numerical values are: it is a very
bad (1), fairly bad (2), fairly good (3) or very good (4) method of governance. The
second outcome variable (E123) collects the informants’ opinion about the following
statement: “Democracy may have problems but it is better than any other form of
government.” Possible answers are: strongly disagree (1), disagree (2), agree (3),
and agree strongly (4).17 The third variable (E235), which assesses people’s view
16The World Values Survey covered the following periods: 1981-1984, 1989-1993, 1994-1999,
1999-2004 and 2005-2008. Among the African countries, only South Africa appears in the five
waves. While countries such Nigerian, Morocco and Egypt are included in three and two waves
respectively, the remaining 10 African countries appear in one wave.
17In the original WVS database the coding structure for the responses to E117 and E123 is as
follows: very good (1), fairly good (2), fairly bad (3), and very bad (4); agree strongly (1), agree
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about the importance for them to reside in a democratically governed country, at-
tributes to each answer a numerical value varying from 1 to 10. While a score of 1
indicates that democracy is “not important at all” for the respondents, a score of 10
means that it is “absolutely important” for them.
DemoHeritagec is a country-level variable, which measures either (i) the pro-
portion of a country’s ethnicities whose ancestors were characterized by egalitarian
and democratic norms or (ii) a dummy variable that equals 1 if the respondent lives
in a country where the first leader is a descendant of an ethnic group with egalitarian
and democratic norms, and 0 otherwise. Xict captures a set of individual charac-
teristics including age, gender, and schooling. While αt denotes the survey-wave
fixed effects, the stochastic error term is captured by εict. The variable of interest
DemoHeritagec being country specific in all the regressions, I cluster the standard
errors at the country level.
As shown in Table 2.6, there is a positive correlation between theDemoHeritage
variable and self-reported attitudes towards democratic institutions in the different
specifications of equation 2.5. More specifically, as the share of individuals who
have inherited egalitarian and democratic norms increases in a country, the taste
for democratic institutions becomes stronger (Table 2.6 Column 1 and 3). Similarly,
residents of countries in which the first leader is a descendant of an institutionally
well-endowed ethnicity are more likely to demand more democracy than their coun-
terparts whom leaders did not have such an ancestral background.
Although this result rules out the political culture hypothesis as a potential
mechanism through which good leaders has generated bad institutions in Africa, it
has the merit to support one underlying theory of this paper. Because descendants
of ethnicities who were governed through equal and inclusive institutions are more
likely to support contemporary democracy, the contention of this paper is reconcil-
(2), disagree (3), and strongly disagree (4).
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Table 2.6: Attitudes Towards Democracy
Democratic System Democracy is Better Democracy is Important
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DemoHeritage (Share) 0.336*** 0.217 0.853**
(0.042) (0.183) (0.315)
DemoHeritage (Dummy) 0.241*** 0.136 0.570**
(0.047) (0.174) (0.205)
Gender (=1 for Male) 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.059** 0.059** 0.046* 0.054**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.019) (0.019) (0.025) (0.023)
Age -0.010 -0.017 0.041 0.037 0.037 0.017
(0.013) (0.015) (0.053) (0.054) (0.036) (0.038)
Education Level 0.031 0.023 -0.033 -0.031 0.319*** 0.270**
(0.023) (0.027) (0.033) (0.036) (0.094) (0.092)
Constant 3.270*** 3.308*** 3.103*** 3.141*** 7.734*** 8.060***
(0.079) (0.081) (0.163) (0.150) (0.395) (0.350)
Wave Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 31537 31537 17069 17069 15471 15471
R2 0.046 0.040 0.015 0.010 0.035 0.033
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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able with the intergenerational transmission of democracy as shown by Giuliano &
Nunn (2013). Nonetheless, the question of why good national leaders have generated
non-democratic institutions, despite the fact that their constituencies value democ-
racy more than other political systems, is still unanswered. In the following sub-
section, I explore other potential mechanisms that may explain this unpredictable
political trajectory taken by certain national leaders.
2.5.2 Beyond the Political Culture Argument
In this subsection, I explore three other channels that historians and political sci-
entists have often highlighted as the reasons why African states may have failed
to deliver inclusive institutions: the leadership legitimacy, the assimilation (or the
lack of thereof) hypothesis and the “politics of the belly”.18 The first hypothesis,
which is closely related to the debate on state legitimacy, asserts that the discrep-
ancy between pre-colonial ethnic territories and contemporary states has weakened
the vertical integration between the society and politicians (Englebert 2000). From
this perspective, the first leaders at independence may have been incentivized to
establish non-constraining institutions as a strategy to cope with legitimacy issues.
For Englebert (2000), leaders of ethnically incompatible states may often rely on
non-inclusive institutions to address potential challenges such as political contesta-
tion. I test this hypothesis by looking at the difference in the degree of executive
constraints - obtained from the Polity IV database - on the two categories of leaders
the first decade after independence (1970).19 As shown in column 2 of Table 2.7
(Panel A), countries with “good” leaders - the ones for which the heritage dummy
is coded as 1 - tend to have less executive constraints than their counterparts. But
when this variable is included in the OLS regression of equation 2.1, its coefficient
18See Bayart (1993)
19For ease of comparison I use the year 1970 because most the African states gained indepen-
dence around 1960.
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becomes insignificantly different from zero. At the same time, the heritage dummy
conserves its statistical attributes as derived from the previous OLS estimation; its
coefficient is negative and statistically different from zero. This result suggests that
the leadership legitimacy hypothesis is probably a poor mechanism in this frame-
work (Panel B Column 2 of Table 2.7).
The second hypothesis, the so-called transplantation theory recently operational-
ized by Hariri (2012), states that early institutional development in the form of
political centralization in particular might have been an obstruction to European
settlement. This author went on to argue that this early statehood has contributed
to limit the infusion of democratic norms although colonization itself was not an “ex-
port of democracy”. Europeans who settled durably in former colonies are thought to
have put in place inclusive institutional infrastructures that would later foster polit-
ical development (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson 2001, Hariri 2012). Thus, Hariri
(2012) concludes that the contemporary autocratic rules in many non-European
states are probably a consequence of early political centralization in pre-colonial
states, which impedes long-term settlement. Using the fraction of the population
speaking a European language as its mother tongue - the data is from Hall & Jones
(1999) - I test this assimilation hypothesis in the context of this study. I find on the
one hand that the statistical link between the heritage dummy and the share of na-
tive speakers of a European language is negative but barely significant (see Panel A
Column 1 of Table 2.7), and on the other hand, taking into account this variable as
a control in equation 2.1 does not affect the quality of the previous findings (Panel
B Column 1 of Table ??).
Before I present and discuss the empirical assessment of the so-called “politics
of the belly”, it is worth putting this concept into perspective. This term, originally
known as “La politique du ventre”, was initially introduced in the literature by the
French political scientist Bayart (1993) in his book “The State in Africa: The Politics
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Table 2.7: Alternative Mechanisms
Panel A: Relevance of Mechanisms using Least Squares Estimation
Dependent Variables are: European Executive Rent
Descent Constraints Opportunity
Oil Diamond
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Heritage -0.008 -0.905* 0.268** -0.323**
(0.007) (0.469) (0.113) (0.134)
Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 43 46 46 46
R2 0.326 0.204 0.448 0.220
Panel B: Mediating Role of Mechanisms using Least Squares Estimation
Dependent Variable is Post-Cold War Average Level of Democracy
Heritage -0.116* -0.139** -0.099 -0.137*









Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 43 46 46 46
R2 0.168 0.217 0.323 0.213
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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of the Belly”. His thoughts are summarized by Berman (1998):
Jean-Francois Bayart chose...“the politics of the belly”... [as] a metaphor
that summed up the constant references and analogies in political dis-
course throughout sub-Saharan Africa to politics as “eating” or “de-
vouring”, of getting one’s share of the state’s resource. These cultural
forms themselves encapsulate the personal, materialistic and opportunis-
tic character of African politics, and the relative unimportance... of
ideology, principal or policy.
To empirically assess this “politics of the belly” hypothesis, I argue that African
leaders at independence may have anticipated the resource potential - in oil and dia-
mond for example - of their newly established states, and this could have driven away
some leaders from their cultural heritage. No doubt that many African countries
were not equipped to conduct costly mineral explorations, but the involvement of
many colonial companies such as the British Petroleum and the Bureau de Recherche
de Petrole - a French institution created in 1945 - in oil exploration for example in
Africa (See Figure 2.6) may have triggered some appetites among the first African
leaders.20 Ultimately, this rent opportunity could have been determinant in the
type of institutions that the new African leadership introduced at independence,
which I believe may have persisted nowadays. To test this hypothesis I collect in-
formation on countries’ potential in both oil and diamond productions, which have
often been identified in the literature as driving the within Africa resource curse
hypothesis through their detrimental effects on institutions (Lujala, Gleditsch &
Gilmore 2005, Ross 2001).
I consider two datasets as proxies for the resource potential of African countries
at independence in order to test this “politics of the belly” hypothesis. First, I use
the average level of crude oil proved reserves over the period 1980-2010 as provided
20For references on oil exploration in colonial Africa, see for example Ferrier & Bamberg (1994)
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Figure 2.6: Activities of the Consolidated Petroleum Company in Colonial Africa
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by the US Energy Information Administration. In particular, I construct for each
country a dichotomous variable that takes the value 1 when the average level of
proven reserves in crude oil is greater than or equal to 100 billion barrels; and
0 otherwise. Second, I rely on a dataset, constructed by Nunn & Puga (2012),
measuring for each African country carats of gem-quality diamond extraction per
square kilometer over the period 1958-2000. Of the 51 African countries for which
this information is available, only 16 countries have produced gem-quality diamonds
over the time period considered with a minimum of about 300 thousands carats
per square kilometer (Lesotho) and a maximum of approximately 210 million carats
(Botswana). To distinguish gem-diamonds producing countries from other countries,
I define a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the country produces gem-quality
diamond; and 0 otherwise.
As shown in columns 3 and 4 of both Tables 2.7 and ??, the results regarding
the rent opportunity dummies are mixed. While the column 3 of Table 2.7 (Panel
A) displays a strong and positive correlation between the proven oil dummy and the
heritage dummy at the standard statistical significance levels, the statistical rela-
tionships between the latter and the diamond dummy is negative and significant at
the 5% level. These results suggest that the countries whose leaders are the descen-
dants of institutionally well-endowed ethnic groups are potentially richer in oil but
have limited access to gem-quality diamonds comparatively to their counterparts.
Moreover, when these rent opportunity dummies are successively controlled for in
the OLS estimation of the reduced-form equation 2.1 (Panel B of Table 2.7), the
effect of the heritage dummy on democracy remains qualitatively intact in the case
of the diamond dummy (it is still negative and significant), but disappears in the
case of the proven oil dummy (Panel B Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.7). At the
same time, the statistical link between the oil dummy and political participation,
as measured by the polity score, is strongly negative and significant at the 5% level.
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In other words, what I have termed the rent opportunity mechanism is well cap-
tured by the oil curse than the diamond curse, which is consistent with a number
of important contributions in the literature on resource curse. For example, Ross
(2001) shows that oil is an obstruction to democracy in the measure that it makes
national leaders less dependent on fiscal contributions while facilitating their access
to repressive means against demands for political overture. If oil, a natural resource,
is a curse for democracy, why diamond, another natural resource, appears to be less
detrimental to democracy in this study? One potential explanation for this empiri-
cal result is provided by Lujala, Gleditsch & Gilmore (2005), who distinguished the
effects of lootable versus nonlootable diamonds on national institutions via their im-
pacts on civil conflicts. For these authors, “easily exploited resources like secondary
diamonds can be used to finance ongoing conflicts that can drag on for prolonged
periods. Nonlootable resources, on the other hand, may even depress the risk of
conflict onset and incidence.” In the context of this paper, this would suggest that
gem-quality diamonds, whose exploitation is both skill and technological-intensive,
are less likely to hinder democracy as implied by the results in Panel B of Table 2.7.
To sum up, “the politics of the belly”, while being detrimental to political partic-
ipation in Africa seems to have been one potential channel through which African
leaders, with good pre-colonial ethnic institutional background, failed to deliver
inclusive and participatory institutions to their contemporary countrymen.
2.6 Conclusion
A recent but growing literature documents that a significant number of present-day
economic, cultural and political outcomes are the manifestations of long-lasting and
deeply rooted societal features. For example, a noteworthy contribution by Giuliano
& Nunn (2013) provides evidence for an intergenerational transmission of democracy
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from pre-colonial ethnic societies to contemporary modern states. This paper is
also interested in the persistence of institutional arrangements, but unlike previous
studies that consider a more pluralist approach - by focusing on the share of the
population with a particular societal characteristic - the emphasis here is on the
ethnic institutional heritage of the national leader and its implications for national
polity. In particular, I match a new constructed data on the ethnic identity of
the first African heads of states with anthropological records to investigate the
importance of the national leaders’ ethnic institutional heritage for contemporary
political trajectory.
Exploiting Africa’s ethnic diversity and heterogeneous cultural norms, I find
that contemporary democratic experiences are relatively bleaker in countries whose
first leaders were the descendants of an institutionally inclusive ethnicity. The sta-
tistically significant and negative relationship between leaders’ ethnic institutional
background and contemporary political development appears to be robust to a set of
control variables including economic, geographical and historical factors, and across
a variety of econometric techniques. In addition, concerns about potential endo-
geneity issues that are susceptible to affect the validity of this finding are addressed
without deteriorating its statistical robustness. As for the potential mechanisms
that may have explained this institutional turnabout, I document that the inclina-
tion of certain African leaders towards rent-seeking, also known as “the politics of
belly”, is one potential channel that may have jeopardized “good” leaders’ ability to
perpetuate good institutions they inherited from their ancestors.
This article adds to a series of intellectual efforts social scientists are making to
explain cross-country irregularities in economic and political development. First,
by linking leadership quality in nascent African states at independence to long-
term political development, it suggests that the impact of individual leaders on
African political development is as important as other historical events such as
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colonial experiences and armed conflicts, as documented in the literature of critical
junctures. Second, on the interaction between institutions and leaders, although
the literature agrees that political institutions and national leadership influence
each other, a fewer empirical studies have looked at the effects of individual leaders
on political system. If democracy and autocracy are thought to be important for
leaders’ selection, this paper shows empirically that the quality of the leader seems
also to matter for the type of political system. Finally, the intellectual debate about
the resource curse has often analyzed the importance of this phenomenon under
the “Dutch disease” hypothesis, ignoring sometimes alternative mechanisms. This
analysis espouses the idea that natural resources endowment may have a detrimental
effect on institutions building through their impact on politicians’ incentives (Caselli
& Cunningham 2009).
Despite their importance in sharpening our understanding of relevant economic
and political issues, researches documenting the persistence of certain societal char-
acteristics are often limited when it comes to policy guidance. Nonetheless, because
it identifies leaders’ inclination to rents as an obstruction to their ability to perpet-
uate the democratic legacy of their ancestors, this study suggests that limiting the




Leadership Favoritism in Africa
3.1 Introduction
Recently, there has been a growing intellectual curiosity in economics and social sci-
ence about the importance of ethnicity in comparative development. For example,
pre-industrial ethnic statehood (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou 2013b), ethnic-level
democratic practices (Giuliano & Nunn 2013) and traditional agricultural tech-
niques (Alesina, Giuliano & Nunn 2013) have been empirically identified as potential
sources of heterogeneous socioeconomic outcomes. It has also been suggested that
while ethnic polarization fuels civil conflicts (Reynal-Querol & Montalvo 2005), the
degree of ethnic fragmentation impedes economic growth via its detrimental effects
on governance (Easterly & Levine 1997) and the provision of public goods (Franck
& Rainer 2012, Burgess et al. 2013). This paper explores one mediating factor in the
ethnic-based argument of the backwardness of many African economies: national
leadership. In particular, it reexamines how the inclination of prominent political
figures to discriminate in favor of their co-ethnics can hinder local development.
In theory, ethnic favoritism operates as a chauvinistic apparatus of power that
restricts equal access to public resources (Fearon 1999, Caselli & Coleman 2013).
In particular, members of the ruling ethnicity tend to exert exclusive control over
the political and socioeconomic privileges of the state. Despite ample anecdotal ev-
idence suggesting the prevalence of ethnic favoritism in the polity spectrum, empiri-
cal research indicates mixed findings. For example, using a cross-country regression
analysis, Kasara (2007) shows that crops growers from the same ethnic groups as na-
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tional leaders in Africa face disproportionately higher tax rates, thus casting doubt
on the widespread presence of favoritism in Africa. In the same vein, Kudamatsu
(2009) provides evidence that inter-ethnic random presidential transition in Guinea
did not translate into significant changes in relative infant mortality among ethnic
groups. Unlike these findings, case studies from Kenya suggest that better school-
ing outcomes in primary education (Kramon & Posner 2012) and relatively high
quality road network (Burgess et al. 2013) are associated with the ethnic affiliation
of national leaders. Similarly, Franck & Rainer (2012) use survey data to show that
the provision of public goods such as education and health is in fact characterized
by a large and widespread ethnic favoritism across Sub-Saharan Africa.
This analysis contributes to the debate about ethnic favoritism in Africa. How-
ever, instead of relying on country-level investigations, it focuses on ethnic territories
within and across countries. This has the merit to shed light on the consequence
of power-driven ethnic bias on local development. In particular, to overcome the
lack of reliable socioeconomic statistics in developing countries, this study exploits
satellite-captured luminosity data as a proxy for subnational development. The
approach builds upon the premise that economic performance, as measured by
GDP, is strongly correlated with luminosity (Doll, Muller & Morley 2006a, Hen-
derson, Storeygard & Weil 2012a). It has been suggested for example that socioe-
conomic outcomes in the historical homelands of the African ethnic groups can well
be captured by outer space nighttime lights (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou 2013b,
Papaioannou 2013). However, these luminosity-based analyses have often ignored
the importance of ethnic favoritism in the African politics.
In Africa, relevant determinants of luminosity, including states provision of edu-
cation, healthcare, and public infrastructures, are often driven by national leaders’
inclination to disproportionately serve their own ethnic groups (Burgess et al. 2013,
Franck & Rainer 2012). Famous examples are Houphouet-Boigny (Côte d’Ivoire)
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and Mobutu Sese-Seko (Ex-Zaïre), who turned Yamoussoukro and Gbadolite, their
respective native villages into lavish cities (Kasara 2007).
This paper does not aim at challenging the validity of luminosity as a perti-
nent proxy for development in poor-data regions. Instead, it argues that ethnic
favoritism which often emerges in countries with weak executive constraints should
not be ignored as a driving factor of luminosity. In particular, I provide empirical
evidence that in addition to measuring actual economic-driven nighttime light den-
sity, satellite images could also be picking up luminosity stemming from diverted
resources in favor of the ethnic group in power.
A closely related analysis, undertook by Hodler & Raschky (2014), documents a
strong pattern of favoritism within the administrative boundaries of national leaders’
birthplaces using a large sample of institutionally heterogeneous countries. Unlike
the approach of these authors, this analysis is restricted to the homelands of Africa’s
ethnic groups, as documented in the ethnographic atlas of Murdock (1959). While
these authors document that less than 4% variation in luminosity for the world as
a whole is explained by the leaders’ effect, the estimates I document for Africa are
as high as 75%.
In what follows, I elaborate more on the data collection process in Section 3.2.
I first present the data on the identity of the African national leaders, their ethnic
affiliation, and the ethnic-level luminosity measures. Second, I report summary
statistics describing the relationships between leaders’ ethnicity and the degree of
luminosity in the homelands of ethnic groups. Section 3.3 discusses the estimation




To test whether ethnic favoritism in Africa is a potential factor driving up local
development, as measured by the intensity of nighttime light density, this analysis
brings together different data sources. First, I explore the Archigos dataset, com-
piled by Goemans et al. (2006), to obtain the identity of the African heads of states
between independence and 2004. From 2004 onwards, I complement the Archigos
series with a manually collected information on the identity of leaders using differ-
ent relevant sources including the official websites of state houses and other media
sources. Second, complementing Kasara (2007) with various other sources, I match
the then identified African national leaders to their respective ethnic groups.
Data on light density at night in the historical ethnic territories were assem-
bled by Michalopoulos & Papaioannou (2013b), who use the ethnographic atlas
by Murdock (1959) and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program’s Operational
Linescan System (DMSP/OLS) satellite image information to link pre-colonial state-
hood to contemporary local development in Africa. The data depict the distribu-
tion of nighttime light, including human settlements and other sources of lumi-
nosity, collected between 8:30pm and 10:00pm local time by the DMSP/OLS. As
in Michalopoulos & Papaioannou (2013b), this measure is obtained from averaging
light density per square kilometer for 2007 and 2008, and the aggregated at the level
of the historical homeland of each ethnic group.
To account for the correlation between pre-colonial ethnic-level statehood and
contemporaneous measures of local development, acknowledged in recent research
(see for example Gennaioli & Rainer (2007) and Michalopoulos & Papaioannou
(2013b)), I use Murdock (1967)’s index of “Jurisdictional Hierarchy Beyond the Local
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Community.” This variable ranges from 0 to 4, and captures the degree of political
complexity within each ethnicity. An ethnicity with a score 0 is characterized by a
political structure circumscribed at the level of the local community. While a score
of 1 and a score of 2 characterize petty and paramount chiefdoms, respectively; 3
and 4 indicate highly centralized entities including large pre-colonial states.
I also consider other relevant variables including contemporary institutional per-
formance, as measured by the rule of law index; development statistics such as GDP
and population density; and a set of location identifiers (distances from sea, border,
and capital) and geographical characteristics (surface area, area under water, land
suitability for agriculture, elevation, malaria stability index, diamond mine dummy,
and oil field dummy).
3.2.2 Summary Statistics
Table 3.1 displays the summary statistics of the light density measures using the
sample of all observations (Panel A) and two alternative subsamples (Panels B and
C). In Panel B, I focus on the subsample of observations that contains luminosity
information of ethnicities for which a co-ethnic had run office at least once between
independence and 2007. In Panel C, the observations are restricted to cases where
a co-ethnic of an ethnic group was the incumbent head of state in 2007.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Obs. Mean St. Dev. p25 Median p75 Min Max
Panel A: All Observations
Light Density 683 0.3682 1.5280 0.0003 0.0224 0.1495 0 25.1403
Panel B: Leader Dummy Independence–2007
Leader Dummy = 0
Light Density 594 0.2693 1.0081 0 0.0170 0.1090 0 13.0862
Leader Dummy = 1
Light Density 86 1.0632 3.3288 0.0294 0.1672 0.4879 0 25.1403
Panel C: Leader Dummy 2007
Leader Dummy = 0
Light Density 636 0.3292 1.4557 0 0.0189 0.1273 0 25.1403
Leader Dummy = 1
Light Density 44 0.9552 2.3139 0.0357 0.2101 0.7754 0 14.1415
Notes: The Table presents summary statistics for the mean nighttime light density data captured
by satellite and use as proxy for local development. Panel A describes the statistics for all ob-
servations. In Panels B and C, the reported descriptive statistics distinguish between ethnicities
affiliate to national leaders and other ethnic groups.
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Both Panels B and C of Table 3.1 indicate a large discrepancy in the degree of
luminosity across the historical homelands of ethnic groups. In particular, mean and
median light densities are significantly higher in the historical homelands of leaders.
For example, while average and median light densities are approximately 0.955 and
0.210 in the ethnic territories of contemporary leaders, average and median lumi-
nosity is as low as 0.329 and 0.167 in the homelands of other ethnic groups (Panel
C of Table 3.1). Similar patterns are observed when I focus on the descendants
of ethnicities that exert power between independence and 2007 (Panel B): mean
and median nighttime light densities are higher in leaders’ ethnic territories (1.063
and 0.167) compared to other groups (0.269 and 0.017). This preliminary evidence
shows that ethnic-level nighttime light density is correlated with the ethnic affili-
ation of national leaders, suggesting that luminosity could potentially reflect some
degree of ethnic favoritism. In the next section, I investigate more systematically
this hypothesis using a regression-based approach.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
3.3.1 Estimation
To investigate the importance of ethnic favoritism in local development across eth-
nic territories, I estimate a specification similar to Michalopoulos & Papaioannou
(2013b). One difference with the empirical model of these authors is the inclu-
sion in the specification of an indicator variable measuring whether a descendant
of an ethnic group has once ruled the country to which his ethnicity belongs. This
would potentially facilitate comparisons with other relevant variables found to be
important determinants of local development. The following equation is estimated:
Lightic = α0 + αc + βLeaderic + γGDPc + δIQLi +X
′
icθx + εic, (3.1)
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where Lighti,c measures, as in Michalopoulos & Papaioannou (2013b), the nighttime
light density in the historical territory of ethnic group i in country c. As already
discussed in Section ??, information on light density were collected by these authors
from the DMSP/OLS database for the period 2007-2008. Like in Michalopoulos &
Papaioannou (2013b), I compute Lighti,c as ln(0.01 + LightDensityi,c) in order to
take into consideration non-normality and potential outliers in the distribution of
luminosity data across ethnic nations. Leaderi,c is a dummy variable that equals 1
if a descendant of ethnic group i was the head of state in country c in 2007 (panel
A of Table 3.2), or has assumed such a position at least once since independence
(panel B of Table 3.2), and 0 otherwise. GDPc is the logarithm of per capita GDP of
country c, which is often proxied by luminosity at the local level. Ethnic-level insti-
tutional characteristics are captured by IQLi, which measures the degree of political
centralization beyond the village. Most of the control variables used in Michalopou-
los & Papaioannou (2013b) and described earlier, including geographical factors,
environmental features and natural resources endowments are taken into account
by the vector Xi,c. Other hard-to-account-for country-specific factors that could
potentially affect light density at night are captured by the country fixed effects
αc. Finally, the terms α0 and εi,c are the constant and the unobservable stochastic
error, respectively. In the spirit of Cameron, Gelbach & Miller (2011) and follow-
ing Michalopoulos & Papaioannou (2013b), standard errors are clustered at both
the country and ethnic-family levels.
3.3.2 Results
In Table 3.2, I report estimates of equation 3.1 using various least squares speci-
fications. As in Michalopoulos & Papaioannou (2013b), I control for a rich set of
variables including the rule of law, population density, location-specific variables
(distances from sea, border, and capital), and a set of geographical characteris-
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tics (surface area, submarine area, land suitability to agriculture, elevation, malaria
stability index, diamond mine, and oil field dummy). In panel A and B, I use
information on the leader in office in 2007 and on all leaders since independence,
respectively. In both panels, I start by investigating separately the relationships
between luminosity and leaders’ ethnic affiliations (Column 1); luminosity and per
capita GDP in 2007 (Column 2); and finally luminosity and political centralization
(Column 3). The coefficients of both income and political centralization are positive
and highly significant across panels. This is consistent with the idea that luminos-
ity is not only a good proxy for local development, but also that early statehood is
important to understand contemporary divergent development paths within coun-
tries (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou 2013b). The coefficients on leader dummy, in
column 1 of both panels A and B, are also positive (0.683 and 0.596) and statistically
different from 0.
In Columns 3-6, I augment the specification with the leader dummy with income
(Column 3), political centralization (Column 4), and both income and centralization
(Column 6). Adding these correlates of luminosity one by one or together has little
effect on the impact of leaders’ ethnicities on local development in the historical
homelands of ethnic groups, as measured by nighttime light density. Controlling
for all the relevant economic, historical, institutional, and geographical variables,
the results suggest that an African leader’s average contribution to change in light
density in his ethnic homeland relatively to other ethnic territories varies between
75% and 82%.1 This suggests that ethnic favoritism is an important determinant of
local development, as captured by satellite nighttime light density. Leaders’ inclina-
tion to divert resources towards their co-ethnics in Africa is large and statistically
significant.
1To compute the magnitude of the leader’s effect, I use the following expression proposed
by Halvorsen & Palmquist (1980): 100(eβ − 1)%.
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Table 3.2: Luminosity and Ethnic Favoritism in Africa
Dependent variable is ln(0.01 + LightDensityi,c)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A.
Leader (2007) 0.6833*** 0.6767*** 0.6194*** 0.6028***
(0.1811) (0.1706) (0.1975) (0.1852)
GDP (2007) 0.5021*** 0.5012*** 0.5110***
(0.1274) (0.1274) (0.1263)
Statehood 0.1599*** 0.1405** 0.1625***
(0.0605) (0.0627) (0.0512)
Rule of Law (2007) 0.5007** 0.2795 0.4809** 0.2616 0.4688** 0.2200
(0.2201) (0.2150) (0.2213) (0.2098) (0.2174) (0.2085)
Observations 680 680 680 680 680 680
Adjusted R-squared 0.490 0.530 0.488 0.539 0.495 0.546
Panel B.
Leader (Indep–2007) 0.5959*** 0.5945*** 0.5690*** 0.5637***
(0.1782) (0.1705) (0.1832) (0.1743)
GDP (2007) 0.5021*** 0.5018*** 0.5119***
(0.1274) (0.1288) (0.1275)
Statehood 0.1599*** 0.1480** 0.1696***
(0.0605) (0.0626) (0.0512)
Rule of Law (2007) 0.5076** 0.2795 0.4809** 0.2680 0.4727** 0.2232
(0.2215) (0.2150) (0.2213) (0.2094) (0.2184) (0.2080)
Observations 680 680 680 680 680 680
Adjusted R-squared 0.110 0.270 0.377 0.481 0.498 0.546
Additional Controls
Population Density Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
OLS estimates linking luminosity to ethnic favoritism are reported in Table 3.2. The depen-
dent variable is log(0.01+light density at night from satellite) at the ethnicity-country level. In
columns 1-6, I control for various variables including contemporary institutional performance,
as measured by the rule of law, population density, location (distances from sea, border and
capital), and a set of geographical characteristics (surface area, area under water, land suit-
ability for agriculture, elevation, malaria stability index, diamond mine dummy, and oil field
dummy). Leader Dummy, the variable of interest, equals 1 if the descendant of the ethnic group
was the head of state in 2007 (panel A) or has occupied such as position at least once since in-
dependence (panel B). Double-clustered standard errors at the country and ethnic-family levels




A recent but growing empirical literature examine the importance of historical
determinism and cultural norms in explaining contemporary cross-country diver-
gence in prosperity and freedom. In particular, early comparative advantage in
wealth (Engerman & Sokoloff 2002), past pandemics (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson
2001, Voigtländer & Voth 2012), slave trade (Nunn & Wantchékon 2011), and pre-
colonial statehood (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou 2013b, Hariri 2012) have hypoth-
esized and empirically identified as potential sources of comparative development. In
this strand of literature, researchers have utilized innovative information gathering
techniques to overcome data constraints that often characterize developing countries.
For example, satellite data that capture the intensity of light density in a particular
geographic area have proven to be a reliable measure of local development (Doll,
Muller & Morley 2006b, Henderson, Storeygard & Weil 2012b, Michalopoulos &
Papaioannou 2013b, Hodler & Raschky 2014).
In this analysis, I argue that in a context where executives have less constraints,
relevant determinants of luminosity might reflect leaders’ tendencies to divert re-
sources towards their co-ethnics. Confronting this hypothesis to data, I document
that the ethnic affiliation of national leaders in Africa is an important source of
variation in nighttime light density across the historical homelands of ethnic groups.
More specifically, satellite-captured luminosity across Africa mirrors a great degree
of ethnic favoritism. This finding suggests that controlling for measures of ethnic fa-
voritism may improve the predictive power of luminosity as a proxy for subnational
development in poor-data and fragile institutional environments.
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Appendix
List of Countries included in Chapter 3 (Tables 3.1 and 3.2): Angola, Burundi,
Benin, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon,
Congo, Djibouti, Algeria, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Gam-
bia, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Lesotho, Morocco,
Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Mauritania, Malawi, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria,
Rwanda, Sudan, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Swaziland, Chad, Togo, Tunisia,
Tanzania, Uganda, South Africa, Congo Democratic Republic (Ex-Zaïre), Zambia,
Zimbabwe.
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